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Abstract 
 
 
Mystical experience appears to have always been a feature of human 
consciousness, and occurs with an enormous variety of content, character, and 
context. A modern awareness of the variegated nature of mystical experience has 
led to particular types being almost automatically considered false, usually on 
somewhat dubious grounds. How might a sound epistemology of mystical 
experience be developed? Most philosophers who tackle this question attempt to 
shoehorn mystical experience into a relatively traditional epistemology, with 
unconvincing results. God or whatever supernatural realm or entity a mystic might 
claim to perceive is a special kind of object, and requires a special epistemic 
approach. A common theme of mystical experience is the special knowledge or 
power that its subject claims to have gained. Perhaps such potentially tangible 
benefits should be made the focus of an epistemology of mysticism. In this thesis, 
my first act is to define mystical experience in a broader, more inclusive sense 
than most other treatments of the topic have done. I then examine the problems of 
formulating a viable epistemology of mystical experience around the traditional 
notions of objectivity and subjectivity, explore the question of whether current 
evolutionary theory can aid us in understanding the epistemic worth of mystical 
experience, and develop a pragmatist epistemology of mystical experience that 
draws on the work of William James and John Dewey. I conclude the thesis by 
arguing for an understanding of mystical experience as a supremely valuable force 
regardless of the reality of the supernatural, and as a potential cornerstone in a 
twenty-first century humanism. 
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I shall now unveil all mysteries: religious or natural mysteries, death, birth, the 
future, the past, cosmogony, void. 
I am a master of hallucinations. 
Listen!... 
I possess every talent! - There is no one here, and there is someone. 
 Arthur Rimbaud, A Season in Hell 
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Introduction 
 
 
It appears that as long as there have been humans, they have displayed an innate 
tendency towards belief in the supernatural, an unseen fabric of reality underlying 
and to potentially determining what we normally perceive. Furthermore, certain 
humans have had invariably astounding mystical experiences of this realm and its 
inhabitants: gods, demons, spirits, ghosts, pure unified emptiness. Even in modern 
society, where science has eaten away the territory that was once the domain of 
religious explanation, religious beliefs and mystical experiences are remarkably 
prevalent. We are future primitives, biologically almost identical to our ancestors 
sketching anthropomorphic spirits on cave walls, but who have obtained 
knowledge of the complex physics and chemistry that create consciousness, of 
how experiences of the supernatural are activated in the mind, of why we began to 
believe in the supernatural in the first instance. Yet there is no escaping the 
experiences and belief, and this seems a mystical paradox in itself. 
 Despite all the knowledge in our possession, nothing can discount the fact 
that there may be a supernatural realm from whence these experiences come. How 
might we investigate the perception of these worlds and entities that can only be 
perceived by certain people or under certain conditions? Why is there a strong 
tendency for some mystical experiences to be considered “more real” than others? 
Can anyone demonstrate truth or falsity of them without appealing to religious 
belief itself? Why does mystical experience exist? Does it have a use? Did it have 
a use? Is it always a pure malfunction of the brain? Does it matter if it is? 
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 These are some of the questions I will be attempting to answer. Over the 
course of this thesis I will be developing a pragmatist theory of mystical 
experience, whereby a mystical experience can be deemed either “valuable” or 
“non-valuable” according to its effects on the subject. Notions of truth are not 
viable in the face of the radically subjective nature of mystical experiences, but 
the experiences may contain multiple layers of beneficial meaning nonetheless. 
 Chapter One outlines my definition of a mystical experience. It contains a 
general overview of the literature that attempts to form such a definition, and an 
extended discussion of what exactly constitutes an altered state of consciousness. 
 Chapter Two examines a variety of epistemic approaches to mystical 
experience. Of particular focus here are treatments given to the concepts of 
objectivity and subjectivity, particularly in the work of Jerome Gellman and W.T. 
Stace. 
 Chapter Three is a short chapter that formally introduces the pragmatist 
theory of mystical experience devised by William James. It also gives an overview 
of the thought of John Dewey, another pragmatist, with regard to religion. 
Although I agree with the general thrust of James‟ theory, his argument contains a 
major fallacy.  
 Chapter Four outlines what I believe is a sound pragmatist treatment of 
mystical experience, based upon the work of Mike Jackson and K.W.M. Fulford. 
Some examples are surveyed to present my theory in greater relief. 
 Chapter Five contains an extended examination of the roles religion and 
mystical experience may play in the context of evolutionary adaptation. At first, 
this section may seem somewhat tangential to my main focus; however, I believed 
it was necessary to give a relatively comprehensive account of what is a complex 
topic, and one that is relevant to any non-moral pragmatism.  
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 Chapter Six is the concluding chapter. In it, I discuss and demonstrate the 
kind of value that mystical experience can hold despite being an evolutionary 
byproduct and supposedly marginalised by advances in neuroscience. My 
argument is that mystical experience should be embraced as a powerful force in 
the aid of happiness and flourishing, and a personal interface for revealing what it 
means to be human.  
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Chapter One 
 
 
And as he journeyed, it came to pass that he drew nigh unto 
Damascus: and suddenly there shone round about him a light out of 
heaven: and he fell upon the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, 
Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? And he said, Who art thou, 
Lord? And he said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest: but rise, and 
enter into the city, and it shall be told thee what thou must do. And the 
men that journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing the voice, but 
beholding no man. And Saul arose from the earth; and when his eyes 
were opened, he saw nothing; and they led him by the hand, and 
brought him into Damascus. And he was three days without sight, and 
did neither eat nor drink.  
    Acts 9:3-9 
 
Within a flash, my state was utterly transformed. From hellish 
torment, I was plunged into ecstasy – an ecstasy infinitely exceeding 
anything describable or anything I had imagined from what the 
world’s accomplished mystics have struggled to describe. Suddenly 
there dawned full awareness of three great truths which I had long 
accepted intellectually but never, until that moment, experienced as 
being fully self-evident. Now they burst upon me, not just as 
intellectual convictions, but as experiences no less vivid and tangible 
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than are heat and light to a man closely surrounded by a forest fire. 
John Blofeld, “A high yogic experience achieved with                  
mescaline”1  
 
In the middle of the night, Siddhartha began to observe his own 
former lives, the lives of others, and the entire space-time continuum 
concentrated in an extensionless, eternal point. He saw the 
universality of suffering (dukkha), the pain of cyclic existence, in 
which beings trap themselves in ignorance and desire, like an animal 
walking around in a circle in a cage. Cutting the circle at the right 
point would bring liberation: he relinquished desire (attachment), 
desirelessness (aversion), and indifference (mixed 
attachment/aversion), and, as dawn broke upon him, cried, “Now is 
birth-and-death finished! The ridge-pole of that house built over many 
lives is broken! 
 Buddhacarita
2
 
 
When I ate eboka I found myself taken by it up a long road in a deep 
forest until I came to a barrier of black iron. At that barrier, unable to 
pass, I saw a crowd of black persons also unable to pass...Suddenly 
my father descended from above in the form of a bird. He gave to me 
then my eboka name, Onwan Misengue, and enabled me to fly up after 
him over the barrier of iron. As we proceeded the bird who was my 
father changed from black to white...We came then to a river the color 
                                               
1 John Blofeld, “A high yogic experience achieved with mescaline”, Psychedelic Review 7 
(1966), pp. 27-32 (p. 29). 
2 Roger J. Corless, The Vision of Buddhism: The Space Under the Tree (New York, NY: Paragon 
House, 1989), p. 11. 
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of blood in the midst of which there was a great snake...It closed its 
gaping mouth so that we were able to pass over it. On the other side 
there were people all in white. We passed through them...until we 
arrived at another river – all white. This we crossed by means of a 
giant chain of gold...I saw a man, the hair on his head piled up in the 
form of a Bishop’s hat. He had a star on his breast but on coming 
closer I saw it was his heart in his chest beating...Just then I looked 
up and saw a woman in the moon – a bayonet was piercing her heart 
from which a bright light was pouring forth...My father told me to 
return to earth. I had gone far enough. If I went further I would not 
return. 
“The vision of Ndong Asseko”3 
 
In the year 1411 of the incarnation of Jesus Christ the Son of God, 
when I was forty two years and seven months of age, a fiery light, 
flashing intensely, came from the open vault of heaven and poured 
through my whole brain. Like a flame that is hot without burning it 
kindled all my heart and all my breast, just as the sun warms anything 
on which its rays fall. And suddenly I could understand what such 
books as the Psalter, the Gospel and the other catholic volumes both 
of the Old and New Testament actually set forth; but I could not 
interpret the words of the text; nor could I divide up the syllables; nor 
did I have any notion of the cases or the tenses...The visions which I 
saw I did not perceive in dreams nor when asleep nor in a delirium 
                                               
3 James W. Fernandez, “Tabernanthe Iboga: narcotic ecstasis and the work of the ancestors”, in 
Flesh of the Gods: The Ritual Use of Hallucinogens, edited by Peter T. Furst (London, UK: 
Allen and Unwin, 1972) pp. 237-260 (pp. 251-252).  
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nor with the eyes and ears of the body. I received them when I was 
awake and looking around with a clear mind, with the inner eyes and 
ears, in open places according to the will of God. But how this could 
be, it is difficult for us mortals to seek to know. 
   Hildegard of Bingen, Scivias
4
  
 
The above examples demonstrate the wide range of permutations possible across 
the landscape of human mystical experience. I take mystical experience to be a 
subset of what can be generally characterised as personal religious experience. In 
the context of this thesis, I follow William James‟ The Varieties of Religious 
Experience in focusing on personal religion as opposed to institutional or 
organised religion.
5
 Furthermore, for my purposes this concept of personal 
religion can be understood as the individual experiences, beliefs, and practices 
directed toward and inspired by what the individual views as the fundamental or 
normally unseen reality and/or entities of the world. Personal religion ranges from 
trivial, routine acts of worship to the full-scale mystical experiences of the kind 
cited above.  
 However, in the light of the rich and astounding variety of such accounts, 
how should mystical experience be defined? A review of mystical literature 
provides little in the way of consensus. This is not only due to the highly varied 
nature of individual mystical experiences, but also because of disagreement 
regarding the methods used to construct a definition. In his book Mysticism and 
Religion, Robert Ellwood differentiates between philosophical and psychological 
                                               
4 Hildegard of Bingen, Mystical Writings, edited by Fiona Bowie and Oliver Davies, translated 
by Robert Carver (New York, NY: Crossroads, 1990), p. 68. 
5 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York, 
NY: Modern Library, 1936 (1902)) pp. 29-32. 
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definitions of mysticism.
6
 Philosophical definitions specify mystical experience as 
a broad type of experience not necessarily defined by content. They supply a 
generalised set of normative perceptual, experiential or intentional attributes that 
should be instantiated during a mystical experience. Psychological definitions 
argue for what W.T. Stace labelled a “universal core”7 of content common to all 
mystical experiences. The search for these common features is descriptivist in 
method; the origins of this descriptivist tendency can be found in William James‟ 
seminal work The Varieties Of Religious Experience. To demonstrate the 
difference between philosophical and psychological definitions, an example of a 
philosophical definition is that of W.R. Inge, “the attempt to realise, in thought or 
feeling, the immanence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the 
temporal”,8 whereas a  psychological definition is more content-specific, requiring 
attributes such as “a feeling of peace” or “perceived contact with God or divinity”. 
 Although most modern studies of mystical experience have utilised the 
psychological method in constructing a definition, most have done so without 
examining the applicability and underlying validity of it as an approach. Is it 
correct to assume that all mystical experiences share some basic content? Can 
historical descriptivism provide the means to identify such content, or will novel 
forms of mysticism present exceptions to the “universal core”? Does it inevitably 
lead to a chauvinistic reductionism that requires the radical reinterpretation of 
some mystical experiences in order to allow their inclusion under the definition? 
These concerns, together with the fact that a broad definition will suffice in the 
context of my work, lead me to reject a psychological definition of mystical 
experience.  
                                               
6 Robert S. Ellwood, Jr, Mysticism and Religion, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980) p. 
15. 
7 W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, (London, UK: MacMillan Press, 1960) p. 41. 
8 W. R. Inge, Christian Mysticism, 7th ed. (London, UK: Methuen and Co., 1933) p. 5. (Quoted 
in Ellwood, p. 13). 
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 Given that William James occupies pride of place as the progenitor of the 
psychological approach to mystical experience, it is fitting that my first objection 
to the method relates to an error contained in The Varieties Of Religious 
Experience. Although I will be addressing this flaw in James‟ work in more detail 
at later point, it is indicative of a common problem of psychological definitions as 
a whole. In essence, James creates a question-begging argument which assumes 
that improved moral conduct is the sole benefit accruing to individuals subject to 
religious experiences.  This is a result of James‟ descriptivism, which focuses 
almost solely on Christian and other western instances of mystical experience. 
Although twentieth century followers of James realised that such a narrow view 
provides an misleading picture, their commitment to a universal core generated a 
tendency to “hold one mystical tradition to be superior or „normative‟”.9 This 
method is useful because it allows the disparate content of various mystical 
experiences to be reconciled in a reductionist definition described in the terms 
given by the normative tradition. It also provides the means by which to classify 
irreconcilable content as outliers, the product of an “borderline and atypical 
case”.10  Stace, for example, differentiates between “extrovertive” and 
“introvertive” mystical experiences, and deems the latter superior in form, 
content, and legitimacy. Extrovertive experiences are sensory and perceptual in 
nature, whereas the introvertive mystic reports “a state of pure consciousness - 
„pure‟ in the sense that it is not the consciousness of any empirical content...It has 
no content except itself”.11 He argues that the “visions and voices” exhibited in 
extrovertive mystical experiences “are not mystical phenomena”.12  The support 
for this argument is weak, consisting of quotations indicating that such 
                                               
9 Steven T. Katz, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism” in Mysticism and Philosophical 
Analysis, edited by Steven T. Katz (London, UK: Sheldon Press, 1978) pp. 22-74 (p. 65). 
10 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, p. 132. 
11 Ibid, p. 86. His italics. 
12 Ibid, p. 47. 
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phenomena are signs that one is on the path to achieving a superior introvertive 
experience, but carry with them a risk of false idol worship, and may be heretical 
hallucinations. Part of his motivation here could be that it is easier to reduce pure 
consciousness with “no content except itself”13 to a definition, rather than 
attempting to reconcile the diverse content contained in mystical visions. 
However, Stace offers little in the way of explanation how such “hallucinations” 
are substantively distinct from introvertive experiences, which could also be 
purely hallucinatory. Identifying what he believes to be the “universal core” 
common to both extrovertive and introvertive experiences, Stace defines mystical 
experience as  featuring (1) “a sense of objectivity or reality”, (2) “blessedness” 
and “peace”, (3) a “feeling of the holy, sacred, or divine”, (4) “paradoxicality”, 
and (5) an “alleged” quality of ineffability.14 Taking the experiences of St. Theresa 
of Avila and Meister Eckhart as archetypal, his dismissal of their “sensuous”15 
modes of mysticism enables an easier comparison with non-Christian mystical 
experience. This reveals an approach contradictory to pure descriptivism; rather 
than forming a conclusion on the nature of mystical experience after surveying 
reports of mystical experience, Stace appears to have a preconceived notion of 
what constitutes the true marks of mysticism. As Donald Bishop notes, such “a 
priori assumptions” and “selectivity in gathering evidence for one‟s preconceived 
views”16 are common amongst those arguing for common content across mystical 
experiences. Katz makes a similar criticism, stating that “these lists of supposedly 
common elements...always reduce the actual variety of disparate experiences to fit 
a specific theory”.17 
                                               
13 Ibid, p. 86. 
14 Ibid, pp. 131-132. 
15 Ibid, p. 49. 
16 Donald H. Bishop, „Introduction‟ in Mysticism and the Mystical Experience, edited by Donald 
H. Bishop (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1995) pp.11-37 (p. 31). 
17 Katz, p. 47. 
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 As it appears to me, achieving a purely descriptivist psychological 
definition is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Many of those attempting to 
formulate one already have a philosophical definition that they are working from, 
explicitly or otherwise. Evelyn Underhill is described by Ellwood as defining 
mysticism “as a quest for truth and reality that goes beyond merely sensory or 
intellectual spheres”,18 but she goes on to develop a very specific psychological 
definition that is almost exclusively focused upon the western tradition of 
mysticism.  
 A definition such as Underhill‟s, which contains concepts such as “an 
overwhelming consciousness of God and of his own soul”19 and “the vision or 
experience of a Unity which reconciles all opposites, and fulfils all man‟s highest 
intuitions of reality”,20 will inevitably exclude some experiences commonly 
considered mystical in nature. For instance, how could such a definition account 
for Buddha‟s vision of “his own former lives, the lives of others, and the entire 
space-time continuum concentrated in an extensionless, eternal point”,21 an 
experience  with no theistic content, or Carlos Castaneda‟s bizarre, mescaline-
induced encounter with a dog that is later revealed to him as Mescalito, the Yaqui 
Indian deity.
22
 The range of mystical experiences documented throughout human 
history vary so greatly in form and content that exceptions and outliers will 
always defy attempts to create a psychological definition based upon a universal 
core. Although Stace, as stated above, builds his definition around excluding 
certain types of mystical experience, more contemporary exponents of the 
psychological method have recognised this difficulty as salient. Jess Byron 
                                               
18 Ellwood, p. 14. 
19 Evelyn Underhill, The Essentials of Mysticism and Other Essays, (London, UK: E. P. Dutton 
and Co., 1920) p. 2. 
20 Ibid, p. 21. 
21 Corless, p. 11.  
22 Carlos Castaneda, The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1968) pp. 25-27. 
12 
 
Hollenback, in his 1996 book entitled Mysticism: Experience, Response and 
Empowerment, decries the “essentialist” theories of Stace and Underhill, but 
develops a set of “distinctive features”23 in the form of a psychological definition. 
According to Hollenback, a mystical experience is (1) “a radical, trans-sensory 
metamorphosis of the subject‟s mode of consciousness” that (2) “gives the subject 
privileged access to and knowledge of those things that his or her particular 
culture and religious tradition regard as ultimately real”, (3) gives “knowledge 
about matters that are of ultimate soteriological concern to their communities”, (4) 
“is heavily laden with affect”, (5) “an illumination that is both literal and 
metaphorical”, (6) “fundamentally amorphous and its content historically 
conditioned”, and (7) “usually has its genesis in the recollective act”.24 Although I 
find some of the features of this definition quite attractive, note the presence of 
the soft quantifier in (7). Hollenback does not subscribe to a universal core, 
adding the caveat that “some mystical experiences will not exhibit all of these 
attributes”.25 However, he does not provide any other definition of what a mystical 
experience might be, aside from a description of mysticism as a “dramatic 
metamorphosis of the waking consciousness caused by simultaneously focusing 
the attention and quieting the mind”.26 Stace also admits that there are “borderline 
and atypical cases”27 which are mystical yet fall outside the terms of his 
definition. Two questions spring to mind here. Firstly, how many features of a 
psychological definition can be absent from or violated by a particular experience 
for it to be considered clearly non-mystical? Secondly, what is the point in 
creating such a specific definition if some mystical experiences do not fall under 
                                               
23 Jess Byron Hollenback, Mysticism: Experience, Response, and Empowerment (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996) pp. 40-55. 
24 Ibid, pp. 40-41. 
25 Ibid, p. 41. 
26 Ibid, p. 1. 
27 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, p. 132. 
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its auspices, and yet are still admitted as being mystical? Here it becomes apparent 
that authors such as Stace and Hollenback have broader philosophical definitions 
in mind that in some sense take primacy over their psychological definitions. 
Hollenback is clearly doing so, but provides no explicit alternative to his 
psychological distinctive features, and gives little in the way of guidance 
regarding cases which do not display all these features. Stace asserts that 
borderline cases which do not instantiate all the attributes required by his 
definition can be considered mystical by utilising a family resemblance concept. 
However, he makes the somewhat bizarre admission that  this is “out of respect to 
the family resemblance school of philosophers”,28 and does not offer much in the 
way of further explanation. He does not address how closely, or in what attributes, 
a borderline experience has to resemble the archetype for it to be considered 
mystical. In a later discussion of such borderline cases, he adds to the confusion 
by mentioning that “in regard to commonly used words common usage is the rule, 
but...it is doubtful whether there is any established popular usage”.29 I believe that 
this vagueness is disingenuous; Stace has a philosophical definition of mystical 
experience in mind, and is attempting to use concepts such as family resemblance 
to reconcile it with his psychological definition.   
 My aim in this thesis is to provide a working epistemology of mystical 
experience. With this in mind, it actually appears to me that many proponents of 
the psychological approach are allowing their definitions to perform epistemic 
undertakings. Returning to Stace again, his rejection of visions and voices 
together with “raptures, trances, and hyperemotionalism”30 is due to his assertion 
                                               
28 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, p. 47. 
29 Ibid, p. 81. 
30 Ibid, p. 51. 
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that they are “a source of weakness”,31 and absent from the experiences of the 
superior introvertive mystic. In this sense, such states are more likely to be false, 
the product of disease or outright fraud. Although, as I outlined above, Stace has 
other reasons for marginalising these features of many mystical experiences, it 
appears that he may be excluding them from his definition in part because they are 
reputedly less epistemically robust. However, given my aim here, I will be 
delineating a different method of distinguishing between genuine and false 
mystical experiences; it would be a mistake to reject some forms of mysticism on 
epistemic grounds at this early stage. For me, a psychological definition seems too 
exclusivist. If the (non-psychological) definition I settle upon is overly inclusivist 
for some sensibilities, the epistemic criteria I present should deem offending 
examples as false or not genuine. 
 Instead of arguing for a universal core of content across all mystical 
experiences, I will define mystical experience as a general form of experience, 
characterised by its phenomenological attributes. On this view, mystical 
experience resembles an affective state or method of belief; rather than having any 
universally specifiable belief content, it is a belief generating mechanism. To 
exemplify what is meant here, let us hypothesise that there is a singular 
neurological “god module”. If manipulated in conscious subjects, we could expect 
phenomenologically similar experiences across the board, but the content of each 
experience would be culturally conditioned. Thus the experience, and at the 
physical level the god module, generate beliefs, but do not specify the particular 
content. Another, slightly weaker, analogy would be sense data. A single sense 
datum, such as my perception of the colour blue, does not contain any content 
other than the fact that I am perceiving blue. It requires contextual sense data and 
                                               
31 Ibid, p. 55. 
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background knowledge to generate beliefs such as “the sky is blue” or “that dress 
is blue”. This distinction between content and the experience generating it bears 
an affinity to John Dewey‟s distinction between religion (beliefs and practices 
regarding the supernatural) and religious (“a quality of experience”32 regarding 
matters of fundamental human importance) which I will explore in more detail at 
a later point.
33
  
 Descriptivism stills has a role to play in my philosophical definition, but it 
informs rather than shapes. Embracing a more normative method will also allow 
my definition to better accommodate instances of mysticism that are either not 
well documented in the historical body of mystical literature, or a new forms 
produced by today‟s increasingly secular, possibly “post-religious” society. 
 Although I intend to formulate a philosophical definition of mystical 
experience, a review of the literature reveals a wide variation in form. Many are 
exceedingly simple, and possibly too much so: for example, Aquinas defines 
mysticism as “the knowledge of God through experience”34, and for Denise 
Lardner Carmody and John Tully Carmody it is “direct experience of ultimate 
reality”.35 Others are much more comprehensive: Ellwood states that “mystical 
experience is experience in a religious context that is immediately or subsequently 
interpreted by the experiencer as encounter with ultimate divine reality in a direct 
nonrational way that engenders a deep sense of unity and of living during the 
experience on a level of being other than the ordinary.”36 My definition falls 
somewhere between these two poles.  
 My general definition of mystical experience is as follows: a mystical 
                                               
32 John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 10. 
33 Ibid, pp. 9-14. 
34 Quoted in Ellwood, p. 13. 
35 Denise Lardner Carmody and John Tully Carmody, Mysticism: Holiness East and West (New 
York: OUP, 1996) p. 10. 
36 Ellwood, p. 29. 
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experience is a state of nonordinary consciousness that is epiphanic in content. 
„Epiphanic‟ here is relatively broad in scope; it does not necessarily entail “a 
manifestation or appearance of some divine or superhuman being” (the Oxford 
English Dictionary definition of “epiphany”). I intend it to include instances of 
sudden insight or revelation that are not necessarily perceived as descending from 
a deity or higher power. Thus, as I am defining it, “epiphanic” content is sudden, 
significant, profound, and of some fundamental relevance to the subject. Geoffrey 
Parrinder describes mystical knowledge as normally “inaccessible to intellectual 
apprehension”,37 and this is in the same spirit, although slightly too narrow in 
scope and suggestive of ineffability for my liking. However, some epiphanies 
under this definition are not mystical in nature: for instance, my sudden realisation 
how the equation y=mx+c represents a straight line on a graph may be epiphanic 
but is not mystical. My definition of mystical experience excludes such 
“mundane” epiphanies by requiring “nonordinary consciousness” as a feature. 
This concept derives from the work of anthropologist Carlos Castaneda, who 
defines “nonordinary reality” as “peculiar states of distorted perception, or altered 
consciousness”.38 (I have substituted „consciousness‟ for „reality‟; the use of the 
latter term was specific to the context of Castaneda‟s work.) However, terms such 
as “nonordinary” or “altered” mean little when applied to consciousness. Any 
student of philosophy knows all too well that the subjective nature of conscious 
experience tends to evade such concrete descriptions. What I understand as my 
ordinary perception might seem alien to another if they could experience it. Can 
consciousness be defined in such a way externally, or are the operations of 
perceptual function subjective? Perhaps altered states are relative to what an 
individual considers normal states; but can this kind of subjectivism provide any 
                                               
37 Geoffrey Parrinder, Mysticism in the World’s Religions (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 1995) p. 11. 
38 Carlos Castaneda, A Separate Reality, (London, UK: The Bodley Head, 1971) p. 14. 
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meaning at all?
39
   
 Although the concept of an altered state of consciousness seems on face 
value simple to define, actually delineating its meaning in a way that is useful and 
free from vague denotations is a difficult task. While it is a relatively common 
idiom, it is just that: an idiom. It lacks definitive meaning aside from its everyday 
usage, which furthermore is usually suggestive of explicitly hallucinatory states. 
To begin with, one could follow Charles Tart‟s definition of an altered state of 
consciousness as a “qualitative alteration in the overall patterning of mental 
functioning, such that the experiencer feels his consciousness is radically different 
from the way it functions ordinarily”.40   However, this appears somewhat 
tautologous, essentially stating that an altered state of consciousness is an 
alteration of mental functioning. Synonyms do not offer much in the way of 
insight or analysis. Tart goes on to state that an altered state of consciousness 
involves a paradigm shift of perception and understanding, a radical change in 
“complex, interlocking sets of rules and theories that enable a person to interact 
with and interpret experiences within an environment.”41 This is a useful means of 
illustrating the nature of altered consciousness, and yet such a definition remains 
problematic. It seems possibly too inclusive for my purposes, as it can easily be 
interpreted to encompass heightened emotional states. For instance, an individual 
who has recently fallen deeply in love might view the entire world in a 
significantly more positive and beneficent way due to a change in overall mental 
functioning. However, to my mind it seems somewhat implausible that this and 
similar cases should be classified as actual altered states of consciousness. Altered 
                                               
39 Ludwig Wittgenstein‟s private language argument comes to mind here. If the contrast between 
ordinary and altered states of consciousness is purely a matter subjective relativity, no criterion 
of correctness exists, and thus any such claims are meaningless. This argument will also be 
utilised in later discussions of mystical experience. 
40 Charles T. Tart, „States of consciousness and state-specific sciences‟, Science 176:4040 (1972) 
pp. 1203-1210 (p. 1203).  
41 Ibid, p. 1204. 
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states of consciousness should not form a regular part of normal waking life; in 
the context of my argument, if this were the case then we could consider all kinds 
of mundane epiphanies mystical. In this respect, Tart‟s definition fails to fully 
capture the “peculiar distorted perception” described by Castaneda. An altered 
state of consciousness needs to be defined as one that breaks with the usual 
function and logic of perception. Yet the problem of how to define “usual” 
remains. Can it be objectified, or is it relative to the normal conscious states of the 
individual? What of individuals with severe mental illnesses, such as 
schizophrenia? In such cases, do anti-psychotic drugs treat their symptoms by 
preventing or ameliorating altered states of consciousness, or do they actually 
induce what is a kind of altered state of consciousness for the schizophrenic, a 
state different from their ordinary psychotic consciousness? An interesting 
example of such a case is that of John Wren-Lewis, who experienced “a 
permanent change of consciousness”42 after awaking from a coma. He describes 
his post-coma consciousness as “a state of quintessential equanimity and stability” 
that “yet also carries the sense of being completely ordinary and obvious...as if it 
were now my baseline”.43 A purely objective definition of ordinary and 
nonordinary states of consciousness, with no consideration for individual 
differences of normal consciousness, will face difficulties accounting for 
anomalous cases such as that of Wren-Lewis. 
 Imants Baruss outlines three methods of understanding and comparing 
conscious states.
44
 The first is physiological: consciousness is understood in terms 
of the neurological states underlying it. The second is cognitive: consciousness is 
understood in terms of cognitive operators and pathways. Under this view, an 
                                               
42 John Wren-Lewis, “Aftereffects of near-death experiences: a survival mechanism hypothesis”, 
The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 26:2 (1994), pp. 107-115 (p. 110). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Imants Baruss, Alterations of Consciousness (Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association, 2003), p. 5. 
19 
 
altered state of consciousness would be one in which behavioural outputs varied 
from those that would be expected given an ordinary state of consciousness. The 
third method is experiential or phenomenological. This is the subjective approach, 
under which consciousness is assessed according to the introspective accounts of 
the individual. Obviously, any fully fledged theory of consciousness will involve 
aspects of all three accounts, as they are not really competing approaches so much 
as differing perspectives. For my purposes however, the physiological method will 
not be of practical use, as access to brain states on the neurophysical level is not 
available. The cognitive method shows some promise, and yet without a 
phenomenological component would strike difficulties distinguishing between 
truly altered states and states like the heightened emotions example cited above.
45
 
Wren-Lewis‟ cases would also prove problematic for a purely cognitive account, 
as he reports that he continues “to function in all the usual ways, from dealing 
with practical matters like talking with the doctors or eating supper, to thinking, 
„This can‟t be happening to me – I don‟t believe in mystical experiences!‟”46 
Without a phenomenological component, Wren-Lewis‟ permanently altered state 
may appear as no different from his pre-coma consciousness. To me, the way 
forward appears to be a phenomenological approach that utilises the type of 
structured guidelines suggested by the cognitive account to avoid being purely 
subjective. Without a structured approach, a phenomenological account will fall 
victim to the kind of pitfalls found in Adolf Dittrich‟s APZ scale, which measures 
                                               
45 An example of a primarily cognitive account can be found in Michael Winkelman, Shamanism: 
A Neural Ecology of Consciousness and Healing (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 2000). 
Winkelman argues that conciousness is a collection of “knowing systems” that can be 
conceived of as “linking biology and experience” (p. 1). According to this model, “[v]ariation 
in processes and interrelated structures that produce consciousness provide the basis for 
differences among the many different forms of consciousness.” (p. 11). However, Winkelman‟s 
focus on shamanistic and meditative practices entails that his theory is directed towards 
deliberately induced altered states of consciousness, and particularly those that are goal-
oriented, such as “knowledge quest” and healing rituals. Under this view, many mystical 
experiences appear as unintended malfunctions of cognitive systems, despite being 
neurologically indistinguishable from induced mystical experiences.    
46 Wren-Lewis, p. 109. 
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altered states of consciousness according to three heuristics: “oceanic 
boundlessness”, “ego dissolution” and “visionary restructuralization”.47 Although 
these terms may comprise an excellent guide for judging a subject‟s feelings in a 
psychiatric context, they are of little use in forming a definition of what an altered 
state of consciousness is. Tart‟s later work,  in addition to that of other authors,48 
commits a similar error: although such theories are a useful attempt at combining 
the experiential with the cognitive, they largely consist of lists of phenomena that 
an individual subject to an altered state of consciousness may experience. 
Theories of consciousness such as those of Dittrich and Tart‟s later work may be 
effective as individual diagnostic tools, but are of little use in providing a concise 
definition of altered states of consciousness.    
 However, what Dittrich‟s scale does suggest is consciousness as a 
continuum between ordinary and nonordinary states. This is the approach taken by 
David Lewis-Williams, who asserts that many theorists “wrongly imagine that 
consciousness is a single, consolidated state”49 with ordinary and nonordinary 
states as specifically discrete units. Instead he argues that consciousness “should 
be thought of as a spectrum”.50 Default ordinary consciousness is defined as 
“waking, problem-oriented thought”. Note that this fixes ordinary, unaltered 
consciousness in a standardised way without compromising possible differences 
between individual conscious phenomenologies. While ordinary waking 
consciousness is “outward-directed” there also exist waking states further along 
the spectrum which comprise “introverted states in which we solve problems by 
                                               
47 Adolf Dittrich, “The standardized psychmetric assessment of altered states of consciousness 
(ASCs) in humans”, Pharmacopsychiatry 31(1998) pp. 80-84. 
48 See, for example: Charles T. Tart, States of Consciousness (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton, 1975); 
Roger Walsh, “Phenomenological mapping: a method for describing and comparing states of 
consciousness”, Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 27:1 (1995), pp. 25-56. 
49 David Lewis-Williams, Conceiving God: The Cognitive Origin and Evolution of Religion 
(London, UK: Thames and Hudson, 2010), pp. 140-149. 
50 Ibid, p. 140. 
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inward thought”, modes of consciousness that reach their apogee when “we are 
day-dreaming: mental images come and go at will, unfettered by the material 
world around us.”51 Such experiences are the product of a very weak kind of 
altered consciousness: cognitive operators process information supplied by the 
internal pathways of the brain, and not external stimuli.  
 From introspection and day-dreaming, we move to what are more 
traditionally considered altered states. Here Lewis-Williams presents two 
trajectories: a “normal trajectory” which terminates in unconsciousness, and an 
“intensified trajectory” which terminates in full-scale hallucination.52 The normal 
trajectory begins with  hypnagogic and hypnapompic states that lie “on the 
threshold between sleep and waking”,53 and are characterised by vivid visual 
hallucinations, sometimes accompanied by auditory and kinaesthetic 
hallucinations, the content of which is distinctively different from those 
experienced during REM dreams.
54
 Hypnagogic and hypnapompic states 
generally feature singular hallucinations, such as facial images, hearing one‟s 
name being called, or a feeling of falling,
55
 as opposed to the bizarre narratives of 
“changing forms and impossible circumstances”56 of REM dreams. Thus, the 
normal trajectory of consciousness follows this course: Waking, problem-oriented 
thought > Day-dreaming > Hypnagogic / hypnapompic states > Dreaming > 
Unconsciousness.  
 The intensified trajectory also features three stages. The first stage contains 
“entoptic phenomena”.57 These are visual hallucinations of a geometric nature that 
occur in a variety of forms that include: an expanding hexagonal lattice grid; 
                                               
51 Ibid, p. 142. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Baruss, pp. 71-72, 88-90. 
55 Ibid, p 89. 
56 Lewis-Williams, p. 142. 
57 Ibid, p. 141. 
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parallel lines; bright dots and flecks; zigzag lines; “nested catenary curves” or 
“scotoma” (catenary curves surrounding a blind spot in vision); meandering 
lines.
58
 Lewis-Williams notes that such phenomena are commonly perceived in 
rather unremarkable contexts such as migraines or concussion. Stage two involves 
the interpretation of the entoptic phenomena, “construing them as objects with 
emotional or religious significance”.59 Here the state of consciousness goes 
beyond viewing entoptic phenomena as a trivial hallucination or malfunction of 
the brain, and attributes meaning to them; “the brain attempts to recognize, or 
decode, these forms as it does impressions supplied by the nervous system in a 
normal state of consciousness.”60 Stage three involves full-scale hallucination of 
potentially all these senses. One may perceive auditory, olfactory and gustatory 
hallucinations, changes in body shape, size, or type, out of body experiences, and 
massive distortions of time and space. Lewis-Williams notes that although stage 
three visual hallucinations feature non-geometric imagery, “the entoptic forms of 
stage one persist, peripherally or integrated with iconic hallucinations.”61 Another 
point that Lewis-Williams makes clear is that the intensified trajectory is not a 
sequence of conscious states that is always followed (for example, a state of stage 
three hallucinations will not necessarily be preceded by stages one and two), 
rather, they merely illustrate the continuum of altered consciousness, which may 
exist in some individuals as a progression and in others as discrete states. 
 What are the benefits and implications of Lewis-Williams‟ model of 
consciousness? The concept of consciousness as a spectrum is an extremely useful 
heuristic, as it clearly recognises a variety of altered states while relating them to 
each other in a viable way. The spectrum model also recognises that some states 
                                               
58 Ibid, pp. 144-145. 
59 Ibid, p. 146. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, p. 147. 
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may fall into a grey area between altered and ordinary, unlike, for instance, Roger 
Walsh‟s approach which supplies twelve parameters that an altered state of 
consciousness may be measured against, but without giving an indication of how 
many or to what degree the parameters need to be satisfied in order for an altered 
state of consciousness to be reached.
62
 Another benefit is a practical combination 
of experiential and cognitive accounts. Lewis-Williams gives quite comprehensive 
descriptions of the separate phenomena experienced in different states, particular 
with regard to the intensified trajectory. His model is particularly strong in terms 
of cognitive function and cohesion, particularly in the way that the outward-
directed / introspection distinction of waking states is mirrored in stage one and 
stage two of the intensified trajectory. This demonstrates how altered states of 
consciousness are, in part, a result of regular cognitive functions operating on 
radically different stimuli. Finally, it appears that Lewis-Williams‟ model could 
provide an account of the problematic Wren-Lewis case. Although Wren-Lewis‟ 
altered consciousness is effectively his baseline, normal, waking consciousness in 
the sense that it is outward-directed and presents no practical obstacle to him, it 
remains an altered state as he exhibits some of the characteristics ascribed by 
Lewis-Williams to stage two of the intensified trajectory, such as a tendency to 
interpret ordinary stimuli in an emotionally and religiously transcendent way.  
 With Lewis-Williams model of consciousness in mind, how exactly does it 
shape my definition of a nonordinary state of consciousness, and therefore my 
definition of mystical experience? Firstly, it does prove that “nonordinary” is 
preferable to “altered” with regards to terminology. This is because epiphanies 
could occur in dreams (an ordinary altered state of consciousness occurring on the 
normal trajectory) that will not be mystical in nature. For example, one morning I 
                                               
62 Walsh, pp. 33-34.  
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might fall back asleep after my alarm has gone off and begin dreaming, only to be 
confronted in my dream world by the realisation that I need to wake up. This is 
certainly a mundane epiphany. Thus a nonordinary experience should typically be 
one that occurs on the intensified trajectory of the consciousness spectrum.  
 However, there do appear to be epiphanies that sometimes occur during the 
normal trajectory of altered consciousness that I would not describe as mundane. 
Dreams perceived or understood as being precognitive are one.
63
 Another such 
phenomenon is sleep paralysis, a special type of hypnagogic or hypnapompic state 
which features “a transient, conscious state of involuntary immobility...[a]lthough 
individuals are unable to make gross bodily movements...they are able to open 
their eyes and subsequently report accurately on events in their surroundings 
during the episode”.64 Those who experience sleep paralysis report a wide range 
of perceptions, including visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic hallucinations, a sense 
of other beings or entities being present, intense fear or bliss, pain, and out of 
body sensations.
65
 Although sleep paralysis rarely seems epiphanic in the way 
traditional mystical experiences often are, those who do not dismiss it as a 
hallucination or kind of waking nightmare often perceive their experience as a 
visitation by ghost or spirit, or in some cases, alien abduction.
66
 Although sleep 
paralysis is an anomalous experience (although certainly not completely 
uncommon
67
), it does fall on the normal trajectory as a subset of hypnagogic and 
hypnapompic states. How might we go about including states such as precognitive 
dreams and sleep paralysis under the nonordinary aegis?  
                                               
63 Baruss, pp. 102-106. 
64 J. Allan Cheyne, Steve D. Ruffer, and Ian R. Newby-Clark, “Hypnagogic and hypnapompic 
hallucinations during sleep paralysis: neurological and cultural construction of the night-mare”, 
Consciousness and Cognition 8:3 (1999), pp. 319-337 (p, 319). 
65 Ibid, p. 324. 
66 Ibid, p. 320. 
67 Ibid, p. 323. Approximately 28% of their sample reported experiencing some form of sleep 
paralysis at least once in their lifetime.  
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 What makes these particular experiences appear epiphanic in a non-
mundane way, and thus mystical, is the significance attributed to them by the 
subject. As in stage two of Lewis-Williams‟ intensified trajectory, the perceptions 
are construed “as objects with emotional or religious significance”. Although this 
is useful, it seems a little too vague for my liking: what is meant, exactly, by 
“emotional significance”? A dream could be emotionally significant just because 
it is extremely pleasant or traumatic, whereas the actual content of the dream 
holds no such significance for the individual. The solution is to link the emotional 
or religious significance to the epiphanic content; the latter must play some part in 
the perception of the former. 
 Now I have reached the point where my final definition of mystical 
experience can be stated. It is as follows: A mystical experience is a state of 
nonordinary consciousness that is epiphanic in content, and such that the 
epiphanic content has emotional or religious significance for the individual. From 
the discussion above, nonordinary consciousness can be generally characterised as 
an intensified altered state of consciousness according to the Lewis-Williams 
model, although normal altered states containing emotionally or religiously 
significant epiphanies can also be considered nonordinary. On a final note, I will 
state that time, with its fading feelings and wavering minds, is not a factor. If an 
experience fulfils these conditions at the time of its experience or immediately 
afterwards, it should be deemed a mystical experience, and not retroactively 
altered if changes in emotional or intellectual understanding occur. The value of 
the experience may change or diminish, but its fact as a mystical episode does not. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
Forming a definition of mystical experience is difficult because such a wide 
variety of radically different instances exist. Many mystical experiences occur 
during prayer, meditation, or in a place of worship. Others occur outside of 
formally religious contexts, caused by neurological conditions, psychoactive drug 
ingestion, or for no apparent reason at all. The context in which they occur forms 
a strong intuition pump. For instance, we can imagine two individuals who report 
the same phenomena: a feeling of being possessed by a supernatural being and 
glossolalia (“speaking in tongues”). However, one has the experience after being 
blessed by the minister during a service at a Pentecostal church; the other has the 
experience while under the effects of a hallucinogenic drug such as atropine.
68
 We 
might be tempted to consider the former experience as genuine, possibly a 
perception of God‟s presence, whereas with the latter our tendency will be to 
deem it pure hallucination, the product of a malfunctioning brain. Are these 
differing judgements legitimately based in reason? To further illustrate my point, 
imagine a third individual who too reports the same experience, this time 
deliberately induced through starvation or sleep deprivation as an ascetic or 
shamanic ritual. This seems to fall between the initial two scenarios, as it appears 
in the context of a religious ritual and yet is the product of a compromised brain. 
                                               
68   Atropine is an alkaloid found in plants such as deadly nightshade and mandrake, which 
produces an effect of delirium that may include feelings of being possessed and an inability to 
form sentences. Micheal Harner cites evidence that these plants were used for recreational 
effect by women accused of witchcraft in medieval Europe. See Michael J. Harner, “The role 
of hallucinogenic plants in European witchcraft”, in Hallucinogens and Shamanism, edited by 
Michael J. Harner (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1973) pp. 125-150.  
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Is there any rational reason to discriminate between these three experiences, and if 
there is, where exactly is the line drawn?  
 A major source of the intuitions outlined above appears to derive from our 
knowledge of a mystical experience‟s causal origin. A mystical experience will 
generally not be considered legitimate unless it occurs under the correct 
circumstances. Even in pre-scientific cultures, mystical experiences occurring 
outside of religious ceremony and ritual might often be discounted as products of 
madness or disease. This focus on causality has been etched in greater relief, and 
become more controversial, with modern advances in neuroscience. Many atheists 
and sceptics see scientific hypotheses for the neurological basis of mystical 
experience as an opportunity to explain religion as a pure invention of the human 
brain. Although I find such willingness understandable, neurology alone will not 
prove to be some kind of panacea for the problem of religion. Just as I cannot 
“explain away” my perception of my notebook as a work of imagination by 
indicating its neurological basis, I cannot deny the reality of an experience of 
God. As neurotheologians Eugene d‟Aquili and Andrew Newberg state, 
“neuropsychology can give no answer to the question of which state is more real, 
baseline reality or hyperlucid unitary consciousness often experienced as God.”69 
Mystical brain states may just be the method by which God makes His presence 
felt. Even if we could find a singular “God” button in the brain which could be 
pressed to artificially induce a mystical experience, to do so as proof that all 
mystical experiences are false would be little different from artificially inducing 
an image of an apple in the brain as proof that all apple experiences are false. 
Another problem for neurological reductions of mystical experience is hinted at 
by d‟Aquili and Newberg in their use of “hyperlucid” to describe mystical 
                                               
69 Eugene G. d‟Aquili and Andrew G. Newberg, “The neuropsychological basis of religions, or 
why God won‟t go away”, Zygon, 33:2 (1998), pp. 187-201 (p. 200).  
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consciousness. A common thread amongst mystical experiences is how they can 
exhibit “hyperreal” perceptions that satisfy “all man‟s highest intuitions of 
reality”,70 and even produce a sense of existing “united with the reality being 
experienced”.71 Although subjective, this conviction of the unparalleled reality 
and authority of mystical experience is difficult to overcome for most individuals 
who have felt it. 
 Another problem with causal explanations on the neurological level is that 
they may reduce every single mystical experience to the same level. Although part 
of my purpose in this work is to expand our perception of what may be included 
under the banner of valuable mystical experience, it remains very clear to me that 
some mystical experiences are more valuable than others, on both individual and 
societal levels. A pure focus on neurological causality could obscure this point.       
 Thus causality, at least in a scientifically examinable sense, does not 
provide a very satisfactory means of passing epistemic judgement on mystical 
experiences. If we assume that all mystical experiences share the same basic brain 
state (although this is by no means true, and in need of significant further study), 
then mystical experiences previously discounted as products of pathology may 
require reconsideration. Rejecting deliberately induced mystical experiences is 
also largely fruitless, as most mystical experiences are induced, occurring in the 
context of religious worship, ritual and reflection. Primarily focusing upon the 
causes of mystical experiences will not yield a satisfactory epistemology. 
             In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James 
distinguished between “existential judgement” and “spiritual judgement” of 
religion and religious experience.
72
 “Existential judgement” analyses a religion‟s 
                                               
70 Underhill, p. 14. 
71 Ellwood, p. 31. 
72 James, The Varieties of Mystical Experience, p. 6. 
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“history and its derivation from natural antecedents”,73 and in the case of religious 
experience, its physical, biological, and psychological basis. “Spiritual 
judgement”, however, is based upon value perceived in an experience‟s content. 
With such value-based interpretation, we can avoid the dead-end street of causal 
judgement, and the unsympathetic reductionism which “finishes up Saint Paul by 
calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital 
cortex...snuffs out Saint Theresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an 
hereditary degenerate.”74 Moreover, this distinction assists in demonstrating why 
causal judgements prove unsatisfactory. Causality plays an important role in the 
traditional correspondence theory of truth, which holds that a true perception of an 
object needs to be in the correct causal relationship with that object. Thus, under 
the correspondence theory, value judgement is derived from existential judgement. 
However, mystical experience differs from regular experience in a fundamental 
aspect: the object perceived by the mystic is not a regular physical object. A 
perception of God is not the same as my perception of my notebook. No clear 
causal chain exists, and as I noted above, simply arguing that neuroscience as it 
stands gives us all the necessary causal information represents a heavy-handed 
and unsatisfactory reductionism. Additionally, if existential judgement is 
considered equivalent to spiritual judgement, then a future comprehensive 
neurological theory which proves that all mystical experiences are delusional will 
strip them of all value. Again, this seems heavy-handed. Perhaps some human 
values cannot be reduced to purely material terms.   
 The correspondence theory of truth is not only popular with materialists 
hoping to reduce mystical experience to a collection of brain states. Jerome 
Gellman believes that some mystical experience is veridical, and adopts a type of 
                                               
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid, p. 14. 
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correspondence theory, arguing that mystical experiences can and should be tested 
against the same criteria as regular experience. Although he recognises that there 
are significant differences between the two, these do not require abandonment of 
the correspondence theory. This is because “our ordinary physical-object beliefs 
are way overjustified by confirming evidence.”75 Thus, it is not the case that the 
correspondence theory is too tough for mystical experience; just that we cannot 
expect it to live up to the same standards we set for regular experience. One of 
these standards that seems particularly problematic for mystical experience is that 
of intersubjectivity: if you question whether my perception of my notebook is 
accurate, you can check it using your own senses. This option is rarely, if at all, 
available in cases of mystical experience. Gellman, however, argues that an 
intersubjective “checking procedure”76 is available. If I want to confirm the 
mystical experience of, for example, a Tibetan Buddhist, I have the option of 
training in Tibetan Buddhist meditation. This may recreate the experience I wish 
to confirm. This appears rather flimsy to me. Not only is it extremely impractical 
in most cases (and perhaps impossible in cases where the experience has not been 
clearly induced through meditation or similar), I have no way of knowing whether 
my experience is an accurate recreation of the Buddhist‟s. “Ineffability” is a 
quality frequently ascribed to mystical experience, and therefore the Buddhist 
may not be able to give me a description of his perception, whereas I can easily 
describe my notebook or most physical objects. Although mystical experiences 
occur in “numbers, diversity and vividness”,77 the diversity and ineffability 
counteract the argument from numbers. It is as if several people (but still a 
minority) can perceive my notebook, but none claim to be able to describe the 
                                               
75 Jerome Gellman, Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate, 2001) p. 27. 
76 Ibid, p. 30. 
77 Ibid, p. 28. 
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qualities of the notebook properly, and the ones we can describe differ 
significantly between us. Without a discernible causal chain or intersubjectivity 
the correspondence theory of truth fails. Although it works well with ordinary 
perception, the inability to provide satisfactory accounts of causality or 
intersubjectivity with regard to mystical experiences means it cannot be applied to 
them. 
 Coherence theories of truth have also featured in historical treatments of 
mysticism. Coherence theory states that a true idea is one that does not conflict 
with any other ideas that the subject holds. Christian mystics were sometimes 
tested using a type of coherence theory: they were questioned on the content of 
their experiences; inconsistencies with accepted doctrine or within the experience 
meant the experience was rejected as delusional or worse.
78
 This kind of use of 
coherence theory seems particularly fraudulent, as it is merely comparing 
mystically revealed content to other mystically revealed content, or to theological 
systems devised without direct knowledge of the divine. Logical contradictions 
within an experience do not seem to be sufficient grounds alone for rejecting it, as 
contradictions and paradoxes are in fact a hallmark of mystical experiences.
79
 
However, sometimes a coherence approach may be useful: for example, in the 
context of experiences claiming precognitive knowledge. If such a prophecy is not 
fulfilled as promised, we have good reason to be sceptical of the experience in 
question. However, not all mystics make such verifiable statements, and there is 
of course the potential that they will be radically reinterpreted or explained away 
when contradicted or unfulfilled.  
 Gellman‟s focus upon intersubjectivity raises a salient issue. As I noted 
                                               
78 The trial of Meister Eckhart during the Inquisition is an example. 
79 See, for example: Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, p. 131. A common paradox reported by 
mystics is a sense of the world being plural and yet singular. 
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above, it is common for mystics to claim that their experiences are somehow more 
objective than ordinary perceptual experience. In contrast, the sceptical view 
holds that such experiences are radically subjective, and have no referent outside 
of the mind. Gellman takes what might be considered a default position in the face 
of such uncertainty: recognising the subjectivity and potential for error inherent in 
individual cases of sense perception, but arguing that intersubjective checking 
procedures can confirm or deny the objectivity of an experience with a sufficient 
confidence interval. However, as demonstrated in my earlier discussion of 
Gellman, the nature of mystical experience is such that the checking procedures 
offer far less accessibility and guarantee of accuracy than those used in cases of 
ordinary experience. As appealing as it may be, mystical experience cannot 
simply be treated as a special instance of sense perception. 
 Acknowledging this obstacle, what is the epistemic status of mystical 
experience? From my remarks thus far, it is probably reasonably clear that I 
believe it is subjective. This is not necessarily because I believe that all mystical 
experience is false and without objective referent, but rather because it does not 
appear that mystical experience can be proven with a sufficient level of 
justification to be objective. As my discussion of Gellman‟s argument 
demonstrated, ordinary methods of distinguishing between subjective and 
objective experience are inadequate in the case of mystical experience. It seems 
we need to look beyond traditional epistemology for a satisfactory account. 
 Perhaps the problem here is that our subjective/objective dichotomy is not 
appropriate in the context of formulating an epistemic account of mystical 
experience, which is radically different from ordinary perceptual experience in 
form, content, and resulting truth claims. To explain the problem in the simplest of 
terms, mystical experience is a subjective experience of an objective reality. The 
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sceptic in me argues that the former prevents the latter from attaining true 
objectivity, at least in the usual sense. I will return to this idea shortly. For the time 
being, however, I wish to give an overview of how others have recognised and 
addressed this issue. 
 William James, in both The Varieties Of Religious Experience and The Will 
To Believe, argues that the subject of a mystical experience is entitled to believe in 
the objective reality of it, and „it is vain for rationalism to grumble about this‟.80 
However, for anyone other than the subject, the existence and content of such an 
experience provide no necessary basis for belief other than that ordinary 
perception is „only one kind of consciousness‟ and that „other orders of truth‟81 
may exist. This foreshadows the pluralist philosophy James would develop in his 
later work A Pluralistic Universe, in the sense that there are multiple ways of 
correctly perceiving and understanding reality. This also reflects James‟ antirealist 
general epistemology, tied to his particular brand of pragmatism. Practical utility 
becomes a proxy for truth, and because of the various shapes utility can take, the 
notion of fixed, objective truth falls away.
82
 I will discuss James‟ pragmatism and 
its relevance in more detail shortly.  
 Taking James as a reference point, William Alston also argues that the 
subject of a mystical experience is entitled to believe in the objective reality of it. 
However, he explicitly goes a step further, asserting that under the correct 
conditions, a non-mystic can be justified in holding such a belief. If I trust X, who 
is the subject of mystical experience which conveyed to him that p, and “have 
sufficient reasons for regarding X as sufficiently competent, reliable, or 
                                               
80 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 414. 
81 Ibid. 
82   William James, “Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways of thinking”, in Pragmatism and 
other writings, edited by Giles Gunn (New York, NY: Penguin, 2000) pp. 1-132. 
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authoritative”,83 then I am justified in believing p. Alston argues that such a case 
is comparable to more mundane incidents of justified belief, in that “if I had to 
rely on my own experience and reasoning alone, I would know little of history, 
geography, science, and the arts, to say nothing of what is going on in the world 
currently.”84 In this regard Alston follows a similar path to Gellman, and faces the 
same problems of intersubjectivity, and the lack of readily available checking 
procedures. When it comes to the authoritative force of the direct experience 
itself, though, Alston develops a slightly more comprehensive theory than either 
James or Gellman, taking an atomist view of perception as his basis. For him, the 
basic elements of experience are phenomenal qualities such as „red, round, acrid, 
or bitter‟.85 The subjective reality of such qualities, when experienced, is 
undeniable. Complex entities that we experience such as trees, houses, and even 
more abstract concepts commonly ascribed to God such as “power, goodness, and 
love”86 remain comprised of such basic sensory phenomena. According to this 
theory, just as we learn through practice how to accurately identify a house we 
have never seen before through our previous experiences of what a house looks 
like, we can identify the love God presents to us through our previous experiences 
of human love. However, such experiences remain subjective. I might identify the 
love of God that I perceived, but there remains the problem that nobody else 
perceived that same loving God in the same time and place that I did. 
Intersubjectivity is still sorely lacking. I might have correctly identified what I 
perceived, but that does not make it any more real than an apple I can imagine and 
define the attributes of.  
 The problem that mystical experiences appear quite radically subjective 
                                               
83 William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991)  p. 280. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid, p. 44. 
86 Ibid, p. 46. 
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remains. We are back to intersubjectivity and the diametrically opposed positions 
of the mystic and the sceptic again. I desire a more definitive, productive, or at 
least insightful epistemology than this bleak impasse. 
 W. T. Stace, like Alston, is a phenomenalist, arguing that “the given [basic 
sensory qualia] is what is certain in knowledge”.87 But unlike Alston, Stace 
presents an interesting and creative argument that mystical experience should be 
considered neither objective or subjective. Rather, he claims that mystical 
experience is “transsubjective”: experience that is subjective in form but „self-
transcending‟88 in content. This claim seems instantly suspicious. How can a 
perception bootstrap itself out of subjectivity? Moreover, what are the 
implications of this novel epistemic category? Should we accept transsubjective 
phenomena as veridical, like an objective perception? If not, then how are they 
different from merely subjective perceptions?  
 The argument for transsubjectivity is based upon two of Stace‟s  
fundamental beliefs regarding mystical experience: firstly, that introvertive 
mystical experience of a singular unitary consciousness is the paramount and most 
completely realised form of mysticism; secondly, as touched upon in my previous 
discussion of Stace, the “argument from unanimity”89 suggests a universal core 
common to all mystical experience. Although I am highly sceptical of both these 
claims, I will suspend my disbelief to charitably reconstruct Stace‟s argument.  
 To begin, Stace‟s definitions of objectivity and subjectivity are required. 
He states that “an experience is objective when it is orderly both in its internal and 
its external relations...an experience is subjective when it is disorderly either in its 
                                               
87 W. T. Stace, The Theory of Knowledge and Existence (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1970), p. 20. 
His italics. 
88 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, p. 147. 
89 Ibid, p. 134. 
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internal or its external relations.”90 Hence, an objective experience is not logically 
incoherent or contradictory, and is consistent with the known external world. 
Accordingly, a subjective experience fails to satisfy one or both of these 
requirements for objectivity. Again, I am sceptical of these definitions, if for no 
other reason than that the notion of transsubjectivity itself can be considered a 
subjective concept, given its contradictory nature. The argument is as follows: in 
ordinary experience, two individuals A and B maintain separate streams of 
consciousness, discrete personal identities distinguished through differing beliefs, 
memories, and perceptions, some objective, some subjective. However, if both A 
and B are subject to an introvertive mystical experience of unitary consciousness 
(also described by Stace as pure ego and the “One”91), there is no „principle of 
individuation‟92 that can distinguish between the content of either experience. 
Both are having the same experience of “undifferentiated unity...which is both 
something and nothing”.93  These singular referents of both experiences are 
qualitatively identical, containing “nothing to distinguish them or make them two 
pure egos”,94 as no thought or perception other than pure unity is present in either 
consciousness. At this point, the grounds for Stace‟s claim of transsubjectivity 
should become clear. His ideal introvertive mystical experience cannot be 
considered either subjective or objective, because it contains no content that could 
be considered orderly or disorderly in its internal or external relations; in fact, the 
experience contains no content at all. Another way of viewing it is that the 
experience is not subjective because both A and B are having exactly the same 
experience, but not objective because the normal checking procedures for 
verifying the reality of an experience are not available. However, how do A and B 
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verify that they are having the same contentless experience? How can they be sure 
that “pure consciousness” is the same experience for each individual? 
 We seem to be back again at the same question we began with: are some 
mystics perceiving a common object? How can we find out?  However, Stace does 
not see it as a problem, as the transsubjective nature of the experience precludes 
any questions regarding objectivity. This rejection of objectivity entails that he is 
only making what Richard Gale calls “a psychological claim”.95 Stace asserts that 
although there is a universal consciousness that introvertive mystics encounter, 
“is” in this case “cannot be taken to mean „exist‟, since this would make it 
objective.”96 Thus we are left with the conclusion that the experience itself is real, 
and to the mystic undeniable, but that it may not be true in a traditional objective 
sense. Epistemically, I find this considerably unsatisfying. The category of 
transsubjectivity gets us nowhere, as it does not give an answer in the terms we 
were looking for. Transsubjective objects are, at best, a common mental object. 
Yet we cannot even be sure that this is the case.  
 It appears to me that the problem here is the radically subjective nature of 
mystical experience. (This may be stating the obvious, but bear with me for the 
moment). Attempting to devise a working epistemology applicable to mysticism 
based upon traditional concepts such as objectivity and intersubjectivity is a 
hopeless task. However, the reason why such epistemologies fail in cases of 
radical subjectivism was not fully explicated until the advent of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein‟s Philosophical Investigations in the middle of the last century. His 
anti-private language argument demonstrates why arguments such as the above 
fail. To give a summary of the argument, Wittgenstein states that an individual 
                                               
95 Richard M. Gale, „Mysticism and philosophy‟, The Journal of Philosophy, 57:14 (1960), pp. 
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96 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, p. 152. 
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could not invent a word to describe a purely private sensation; the word would not 
have a “criterion of correctness”.97 As meaning and therefore language are public 
constructs, the private linguist would have no test outside her subjective 
awareness to ensure the invented word was being used correctly. 
 Applied to mystical experience, Wittgenstein‟s argument suggests that 
Stace cannot base his argument upon mystics‟ phenomenological claims. The 
undifferentiated unity, a perception of both everything and nothing, seems a 
classic case of a private sensation, particularly when combined with the 
ineffability claimed by most mystics. Furthermore, Stace is making his argument 
for transsubjectivity using reports of such subjective, private experience as a 
fundamental premise. In the case of A and B, we have no way of knowing that 
their experiences, although described in the same or similar terms, are 
qualitatively identical; and they must be if Stace‟s argument is to be considered 
valid. Stace asserts that the principle of unanimity proves that mystics “are not 
misdescribing what they experience”,98 but without a criterion of correctness, 
what a mystic claims to be an accurate description of his experience is reduced to 
“whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we 
can‟t talk about „right‟.”99  
 To my mind, it is not surprising that radically subjective mystical 
experience does not provide the fertile ground necessary to cultivate an 
epistemology. Given this impasse, what is the correct epistemic approach? Gale, 
in closing his discussion of Stace, points in what I believe is the correct direction. 
“The question, „Which is the true reality, the one revealed to us in mystical 
experiences or the one revealed to us in our non-mystical experiences?‟, is really a 
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value question and cannot be settled by any logical means. What a man takes to be 
the really real is a value judgment expressive of what experiences have the 
greatest significance for him.”100  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
100 Gale, p. 481. His italics. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
My previous discussion of William James suggests more fertile ground for 
cultivating a worthwhile epistemology. If we focus upon examining a mystical 
experience in terms of its value to the subject, we can put aside the subject/object 
concerns of the correspondence theory. James develops such a pragmatist theory, 
and summarises his approach as follows: “Immediate luminousness, in short, 
philosophical reasonableness, and moral helpfulness are the only available 
criteria”.101 In other words, mystical experience should be judged upon the basic 
coherence of its content and its moral benefit to the subject. The latter criterion is 
James‟ primary focus throughout The Varieties of Religious Experience. This 
appears compelling: if God is an entity of total benevolence, purity, and every 
other characteristic ascribed to Him, genuine contact with Him should result in a 
morally improved subject. James‟ pragmatism also gives us a clearly testable 
hypothesis, albeit by somewhat subjective means. Another major benefit that I 
perceive in such pragmatism is that it renders speculation about the existence of 
God and the cause of mystical experience somewhat unnecessary. If a pragmatism 
such as James‟ provides a satisfactory working account of mystical experience, 
difficult and most probably unanswerable questions regarding the veridicality of 
such experiences fall out of the picture. If a mystical experience assists the 
subject, we can declare that there is some form of value in it without further 
inquiry being necessary. Pragmatic value can become a proxy for objective truth 
in the absence of a clear proof defining the latter. However, it is of importance 
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here to note that I am not endorsing some variety of pragmatist antirealism 
regarding the ordinary physical world, as James is guilty of. As demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, mystical perceptions are something of a special class of 
experience. It appears to me that a means of circumventing the cat‟s cradle that is 
the debate over objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity (not to mention 
transsubjectivity) is an epistemology worth developing.   
 Although James‟ pragmatism is an excellent starting point, and was a 
revolutionary approach to religion in its time, it has one major flaw. His sole focus 
upon morality as the benefit accruing to the mystic is reductionist, and begs the 
question. This narrow view derives, in my opinion, from his Judeo-Christian 
foundations and the descriptivism of The Varieties of Religious Experience, which 
focuses almost exclusively on examples supplied by Christians of various 
denominations. Although the Christian God is often portrayed as a primarily 
moral entity, in other religions this is not the case. In what one might label 
“primitive” religions, deities are often malevolent, capricious entities, capable of 
bestowing great pain as well as great power. Gods of polytheistic religions often 
operate out of self-interest rather than concern for the well-being of humanity. In 
the context of such religions, a mystic would probably not be expected to gain 
greater moral fortitude so much as special power, knowledge, or luck. Therefore, 
James‟ argument begs the question: 
P1) A true
102
 experience is of practical assistance to the subject, by virtue of the   
qualities of the object(s) experienced. 
P2) God is a moral entity. 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
C)   A true experience of God will be of moral assistance to the subject. 
 
                                               
102 Here “true” is meant in James‟ pragmatic sense of the word. James‟ pragmatism is essentially 
antirealist in nature, arguing that truth is a concept derived from effect. 
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P2 lacks proof, as we have no knowledge of God being a moral entity outside of 
experiences of Him, and hence P2 operates with the conclusion in a circular 
manner. As cited above, there is no a priori reason that God should be necessarily 
be considered a moral entity. If the only experiences of God considered true are 
those that provide moral assistance, then God will always be considered moral by 
nature of the qualities described and evinced by those who have the true 
experiences.  In the Judeo-Christian tradition James is working from, mystical 
experiences of a morally neutral, amoral, or immoral God would have been 
rejected as fraudulent, thus creating a self-confirming hypothesis that God is a 
moral entity. This may be a result of James working backwards from the 
conclusion to some extent, with his psychological descriptivism taking primacy 
over philosophy.  
 James views „saintliness‟, unsurpassed moral purity, as the apogee of 
practical value deriving from mystical experience. He contrasts this with the 
“worldly passions”103 epitomised by the ubermensch championed in the anti-
religious philosophy of Nietzsche. According to James, morality is the sole benefit 
of mysticism; it cannot directly engender other valuable traits and behaviours. It 
seems counterintuitive to me that even the God of Christianity would be solely 
concerned with morality. John Dewey, a pragmatist following the trail blazed by 
James, agrees. Dewey, in his work A Common Faith, distinguishes between 
“religion” and “religious”: the former denotes “a special body of beliefs and 
practices having some kind of institutional organization”;104 the latter denotes “a 
quality of experience”105 defined by “the effect produced, the better adjustment in 
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life and its conditions, not the manner and cause of its production.”106 Throughout 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, James asserts that religious experiences of 
the supernatural are “gifts to us”107 that act through human agents as “heralds and 
harbingers, and...leavens also, of a better order.”108 In contrast, Dewey believes 
humanity would benefit greatly from a rejection of religion, particularly the 
accompanying beliefs in the supernatural, and directing religious emotion towards 
secular, humanist ends. For Dewey, religious experience is not purely moral, but 
encompasses the “aesthetic, scientific, moral, political”,109 possibly all at the same 
time. The “religious” emotion Dewey speaks of comprises the most powerful 
motivations and passions, but is not defined by any content aside from an absence 
of supernatural content.  
 My pragmatist epistemology of mystical experience utilises this 
foundation laid by Dewey. The only satisfactory way to address mystical 
experience is through an assessment of its products, but the range of these 
products may be extremely broad. To begin, I need to reiterate my belief that my 
pragmatist epistemology does not primarily seek to address the question of 
whether a given mystical experience is veridical or otherwise. The existence of a 
deity, or deities, or a perceivable ultimate reality is not sufficiently testable, even 
by pragmatist methods. The goal of my epistemology is to classify mystical 
experiences as valuable or non-valuable; this is as far as we can go while 
remaining on stable ground.  
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Chapter Four 
 
 
I want to argue for assessing mystical experience on the grounds of “helpfulness” 
in general, and not merely on the grounds of “moral helpfulness”. James appears 
to imply such an approach in The Varieties of Religious Experience, but avoids it 
in his explicit description of the criteria for examining religious experience. He 
writes of assessing a “belief” on “the way it works on the whole”,110 and notes 
that despite the often pathological character of human genius, the products of such 
minds “are invariably tested by logic and experiment”.111 James wants the value 
of religious and mystical experiences to be considered in an equal fashion to more 
mundane varieties of experience, but he falls short of fully realising this goal 
because he regards religion as solely a source of moral belief and behaviour. To 
build upon his own analogy comparing the minds of the genius and the mystic, 
James‟ approach is akin to presuming that a scientific genius could never make 
any valuable pronouncement on matters of morality. I do not believe that James 
held some prejudicial belief that all non-moral revelation was worthless, rather, he 
held that all revelation was moral in its focus or that its eventual benefit was 
ultimately a matter of morality. It appears distinctly possible to me that he 
believed the latter after realising that a more standard pragmatist approach to 
assessing religious experience is fraught with the problems I am about to navigate. 
 What of this more general concept of “helpfulness”? Such a concept 
obviously needs refining; at first glance, it seems that many mystical experiences 
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are unhelpful in the usual sense. Those periodically experiencing mystical 
episodes may feel with great fear that they are losing their sanity, or be ostracised 
by society after revealing their anomalous experiences, or distance themselves 
from ordinary life because of its perceived triviality in comparison with the 
mystical realm. “Helpfulness” in this sense is focused on an individual‟s 
interactions with reality as observed from a third-person perspective; although 
mystical experiences are not purely moral in the benefits they provide and can 
often provide knowledge that assists in interactions with reality, their 
consequences are often too complex for us to expect that they can always be 
satisfactorily assessed in the same way that my knowledge that 2 + 2 = 4 can be 
understood as assisting me in my everyday life. A subject of mystical experience 
may, for instance, leave his comfortable home and occupation to live a life of 
squalor, asceticism and even moral depravity due to his revelatory experience, and 
yet still feel that experience has great value for him, value that easily supersedes 
all else. Rather than being “helpful” in some pragmatic sense, I argue that such 
experiences “empower” an individual, “empowerment” not merely being 
contingent on an individual‟s pragmatic success. 
 To develop this concept, I take Mike Jackson and K.W.M. Fulford‟s paper 
“Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology” as my starting point.112 In this paper, 
Jackson and Fulford explore the relationship between psychotic phenomena and 
spiritual experience with specific regard to psychiatric diagnosis, with a focus on 
a central paradox: although mystical experience shares many of the qualities 
attributed to psychosis, and is often diagnosed as such by traditional psychiatry, 
“it would be quite wrong…to “treat” spiritual psychotic experiences with 
neuroleptic drugs, just as it is quite wrong to „treat‟ political dissidents as though 
                                               
112  Mike Jackson and K.W.M. Fulford, “Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology”, Philosophy,  
Psychiatry, and Psychology, 4:1 (1997), pp. 41-65. 
46 
 
they were ill.”113 They seek to distinguish “spiritual from pathological forms of 
psychotic experience”,114 where treatment would be required in the latter but not 
the former. Rejecting models that decree all mysticism as mental illness as 
“defined by objective norms of bodily and mental functioning”,115 and others that 
argue for mental illness as a concept invented for the purposes of social exclusion 
or political control, Jackson and Fulford propose a model based around the 
concept of “action failure” as a determinant for pathological psychotic experience. 
On this model, an individual‟s experience is defined as spiritual if it empowers the 
individual in the sense that “action is radically enhanced”,116 or as pathological if 
there is “radical failure of action”.117 The spiritual psychotic will be motivated by 
his experience, whereas the pathological psychotic will be disturbed and 
disconcerted to such an extent by the content of his experience that he cannot act 
upon it. What constitutes the action that may be enhanced or otherwise will 
depend upon the intentions and values of the individual.  
 Jackson and Fulford recognise that their method of distinguishing between 
spiritual and pathological experiences is potentially vague and subjective.  
However, they argue that any accurate circumscription of the topic will 
necessarily face such problems, as “the distinction between health and ill-
health...may sometimes not be finally decidable at all”118 given the subjectivity 
and complex behaviour involved. They are correct that some borderline cases will 
prove highly problematic. For example, instances of extreme asceticism inspired 
by religious fervour are relatively common throughout history; are these mystical 
experiences failures of action? Or are they enhanced action, even in cases such as 
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that of the ascetic Vianney whose account James cites as one who would “never 
smell a flower, never drink when parched, never drive away a fly, never show 
disgust before a repugnant object, never complain of anything that had to with his 
personal comfort, never sit down, never lean upon his elbows when kneeling.”119 
Is this the product of enlightenment, or pathology masquerading as fastidious self-
abnegation? It seems that this approach may lead to some conclusions that will 
prove surprising and possibly unsavoury to our common sense. Nonetheless, I 
believe Jackson and Fulford‟s method is worthwhile, and can be developed so as 
to become more robust and theoretically sound. 
 As a way of developing my own account differentiating between spiritual 
and pathological experience,
120
 I will consider the critique of Jackson and Fulford 
offered by Marek Marzanski and Mark Bratton.
121
 Jackson and Fulford are solely 
medical in their focus, basing their concept of pathological experience on a 
definition of illness as “failure of action”.122 In contrast, Marzanski and Bratton 
write from what they assert is a more religiously informed perspective, and view 
Jackson and Fulford as overly reductionist in their approach. Marzanski and 
Bratton argue that viewing spiritual experience purely in terms of action 
“ignore[s] the importance of the relationship between experience and the broader 
pattern of the subject‟s life usually emphasized in the religious traditions.”123 In 
other words, simple “action” is often not the focus of religious experience and 
doctrine; rather, they are concerned with less tangible aspects of human life such 
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as long term well-being and happiness in the face of debilitating difficulty. 
According to Marzanski and Bratton, a satisfactory method of distinguishing 
between spiritual and pathological experience must account for this, and recognise 
that “theology or doctrine is not simply a layer that can be pared away...rather it 
encompasses the language and tradition in which the religious self is formed.”124 
Certain types of spiritual experience will not be action-enhancing by their very 
nature or because of the way they relate to a larger framework of both religious 
and non-religious belief, and yet be no less legitimate in terms of their religiosity. 
According to Marzanski and Bratton‟s interpretation, Jackson and Fulford will 
inevitably fail to provide an adequate account of such experiences which have no 
effect or negative effect in terms of outwardly observable action. The previous 
quote also links with Marzanski and Bratton‟s belief that Jackson and Fulford 
“construe too narrowly the meaning of spiritual experience”,125 creating an 
artificial division between religious experience and what could be called “the 
religious life”. This is a very salient issue, and a criticism directed at philosophers 
of religion dating back to James; I plan to return to it later. 
 Although I share Caroline Brett‟s scepticism that Marzanski and Bratton 
are correct in their interpretation of Jackson and Fulford,
126
 such 
misunderstandings are to be expected given the somewhat vague nature of the 
latter‟s position. Regardless of such exegetic matters, I want to build upon 
Jackson and Fulford‟s method for distinguishing between spiritual or pathological 
experiences. One of the strongest criticisms Marzanski and Bratton make is that 
“Jackson and Fulford do not attempt to define experience in terms of its intrinsic 
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properties, for example, inner feelings and altered states of consciousness”.127 
Instead, at least on this interpretation, Jackson and Fulford adopt an overly 
behaviourist view of religious experience, and define action enhancement purely 
in terms a “subject‟s ability to do what he normally does even better.”128 Although 
I agree with their focus upon action as a means of distinguishing between spiritual 
and pathological experiences, the narrow definition of “action” employed is very 
much a limiting factor in their theory. Rather than being problematic because 
Jackson and Fulford fail to recognise the importance of the wider framework of 
religious belief and tradition, the counterexamples presented by Marzanski and 
Bratton are effective because they are not clearly action enhancing for the subjects 
concerned, although this does not appear to be Marzanski and Bratton‟s main 
focus.  
 Jackson and Fulford differentiate between “spiritual” and “pathological” 
experiences, whereas I want to distinguish between “valuable” and “non-
valuable” experiences. Although I think these separate heuristics are largely 
interchangeable, I want to move away from the medical and psychiatric 
connotations of the spiritual/pathological distinction. Given my personal opinion 
that all mystical experience is “in the head”, I would say that it is all 
“pathological” in a certain sense.  Brett appears to share this concern that “both 
aspects may co occur in an individual”.129 If I kept Jackson and Fulford‟s 
typology, I suspect it would obscure my point that the origin or cause of an 
experience is a different matter to whether that experience is valuable or useful to 
an individual. On my view, the “value” of a mystical experience is the only 
meaningful sense with which we can discuss such phenomena; any other labels 
                                               
127 Marzanski and Bratton, p. 364. Their italics. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Brett, p. 379. 
50 
 
are about as meaningful as the veridical / non-veridical distinction discussed 
previously. Jackson and Fulford encounter problems because they are using a 
broadly behaviourist criterion as a proxy for distinguishing between psychological 
properties that are inaccessible, or not as accessible.
130
 Anthony Storr expresses a 
similar sentiment when he states his belief in “the inadequacy of psychiatric 
categorisation...the distinction „spiritual‟ versus „pathological‟ should be dropped. 
Everyone is liable to have deeply irrational experiences or hold deeply irrational 
beliefs which may be destructive or may be life-enhancing.”131 As all mystical 
experience might be considered “irrational” in some sense (“psychotic” in Jackson 
and Fulford‟s vocabulary), what really matters is the value or use of an experience 
and the beliefs resulting from it have to an individual. It may be that often there is 
no property intrinsic to a particular mystical experience that determines it as 
valuable or otherwise; it is purely up to the subject in terms of what influence the 
experience will exert upon them. I think this observation is particularly relevant in 
cases where the subject believes that the experience in question ultimately finds 
its cause in something other than a divine being or similar causal entity. 
 I wish to utilise Jackson and Fulford‟s method for distinguishing between 
spiritual and pathological experience around the concept of action enhancement. 
However as discussed above it is not without problems. Their basic definition of a 
spiritual, as opposed to pathological, experience needs to be further refined and 
possibly expanded.  
 For the moment, let us return to issues of vocabulary. Under a pragmatist 
view, meaning is effect. A mystical experience that initiates action in a subject has 
                                               
130 Jackson and Fulford would take issue with this, and point out that they essentially reduce the 
meanings of „spiritual‟ and „pathological‟ to their properties in terms of action enhancement. 
However, given the psychiatric focus of their paper, I would argue that their classification will 
inevitably be seen as correlating with internal states such as „benign‟ and „malign‟ psychoses.  
131 Anthony Storr, “Commentary on „Spiritual experience and psychopathology‟”‟, Philosophy, 
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an effect on that subject, and therefore has meaning for that subject. From this, we 
can see that “meaning” is interchangeable with “value”. A valuable experience is 
one that has actionable meaning. Given the fundamental significance of the 
content of mystical experiences, we should expect them to have some effect, some 
course of action derived from the content and its meaning to the subject. A 
mystical experience that exhibits no effect on its subject is an experience that has 
no meaning for the subject. In such a case, we can assume that the experience is 
not veridical, if we wish to fall back into those terms. 
 An action-enhancing mystical experience is one that has actionable 
meaning, and therefore value. But what is the meaning of “action-enhancing”? 
What kind of actions fall under this umbrella? And what actions or behaviours fall 
outside it? Previously I criticised Jackson and Fulford for the subjectivity I 
perceived in statements such as “whether they [mystical experiences] are spiritual 
(good) or pathological (bad) depends...on the way in which they are embedded in 
the structure of values and beliefs by which the actions of the subjects concerned 
are defined.”132 Although I stand by these criticisms in the sense that Jackson and 
Fulford make little attempt to clarify what exactly is meant by “action-
enhancing”, they are correct that a certain reliance on subjectivity is inescapable. 
However, this is not the kind of subjectivity that arises because I am exercising 
my personal judgement, the kind of subjectivity inherent in a statement such as 
“apples taste better than oranges”. Rather, it is subjective because the question of 
whether a subject experiences action-enhancement or otherwise is dependent, at 
least in part, upon his reaction to the experience. As noted above, meaning is a 
salient concept, and whether a subject is empowered or otherwise by a mystical 
experience will depend upon the meaning he draws from it. A similar assertion 
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can be made regarding value: if a subject dismisses a mystical experience as 
having no value (for instance, when the subject believes their experience is a 
symptom of psychosis), our assessment of that value will depend upon his 
subjective reaction. However, such assessments cannot be purely dependent upon 
the subjective experience of a subject. This will not yield a satisfactory 
epistemology. To build such a theory, the role of subjectivity must be seated 
within a more substantial framework. 
 The concepts of action and empowerment I will use are based upon the 
concept of flourishing. However, this is not necessarily the same as the 
“flourishing” that has been much discussed in the moral philosophy of the past 
fifty years and finds its origins in Aristotle; a concept which is loaded with 
implications regarding virtue and other problems of morality. With my above 
discussion of James in mind, it should be clear that considerations of ethics and 
morality are not a viable starting point for examining mystical experience. 
Thomas Hurka outlines a contrast between “substantive” and “formal” 
conceptions of flourishing. The former “equates flourishing with some 
determinate state F of people or their lives”, whereas the latter “does not equate 
flourishing with any independent good F but only with the general idea of human 
good, whatever its content”.133 In the context of mystical experience, we cannot 
argue for a substantive state of morality that constitutes flourishing. We also 
cannot argue for a set of moral virtues that lead to an indeterminate general idea of 
flourishing. To do either would be to repeat James‟ fallacy, as they comprise 
prejudicial judgements of what type of moral values or virtues might exist 
objectively, and could be revealed by mystical experience. What we must use is a 
formal concept that breaks apart the moral and intellectual virtues originally 
                                               
133 Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 
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prescribed by Aristotle. 
 Continuing in the vein of Jackson and Fulford, I would argue that a 
flourishing life is one lived in a coherently goal-directed, passionate manner. We 
should expect a valuable mystical experience to engender flourishing by aiding in 
and providing for the development of intellectual virtues specified by Aristotle: 
demonstrative knowledge, creativity, practical knowledge, intuition, and 
wisdom.
134
 On this view, activity and productivity are essential features of human 
life. In this sense, “flourish” can be juxtaposed against “languish”, which shares 
its etymology with “languid”, a state of apathy, indifference, and inactivity. We 
can actually see how passionate activity is essential to flourishing through an 
argument constructed by Philippa Foot against the separation of flourishing from 
morality. Foot, in considering why some immoral individuals flourish and claim to 
be perfectly happy, cites the case of German citizens who were imprisoned and 
executed after protesting against Nazi treatment of the Jews and other minorities. 
If immoral individuals can flourish, she asks, should these men have chosen not to 
speak out and lead longer, happier lives as free men? “One may think that there 
was a sense in which the [prisoners] did, but also in a sense did not, sacrifice their 
happiness in refusing to go along with the Nazis.”135 Foot‟s argument is that by 
refusing to comply, they were flourishing in a moral sense, and because of the 
compunction they would have felt, could not have flourished or been happy if 
they had complied. However, we can also view their flourishing in the nonmoral 
way I define it. The men flourished (at least in a certain sense) because they saw it 
as their purpose to take action against Nazi injustice and inhumanity. Their 
reasons may have been moral, but we can also interpret their lives in a nonmoral, 
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goal-oriented sense. Additionally, if they had complied with the Nazis to avoid 
execution, they could not have flourished as free men if they perceived a failure of 
action on their part. This could haunt their days just as Foot suggests the feeling of 
moral compromise could. 
 In this spirit, Corey Keyes places “flourishing” and “languishing” at 
opposite ends of a “mental health continuum”; like Jackson and Fulford, he argues 
that mental illnesses are not simple cases of identifiable symptoms such as 
delusions or hallucinations, but a matter of how an individual functions as a 
person and as a member of society. Arguing “for a definition of mental health as 
more than the absence of mental illness”,136 Keyes quotes the U.S. Surgeon 
General‟s definition of mental health as “a state of successful performance of 
mental function, resulting in productive activities, fulfilling relationships with 
people, and the ability to adapt to change and to cope with adversity”.137 Keyes 
interprets “subjective well-being”138 as comprising a major feature of mental 
health and flourishing, arguing for “mental health as a syndrome of symptoms of 
positive feelings and positive functioning in life”.139 This emphasis of “positive 
feelings” draws out the type of subjectivity I wish to utilise. How a subject feels 
about her mystical experience is a critical factor in judging its value.  
 At this point, it is important to clarify that the link between harbouring 
positive feelings about a mystical experience and the experience having value 
does not necessitate that the content of the experience must be positive in the 
sense that “positive” is synonymous with “pleasant” or “comforting”. The content 
does not need to be of this nature, simply the subject‟s feelings towards it; this is 
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137 Ibid. Quoted from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Mental Health: A Report of 
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part of the “positive functioning” aspect of Keyes‟ stipulation. One can actually 
loathe the experience but feel positive about it on a wider view that brings 
consequences and implications to the forefront. A mundane example might be 
cleaning a house or performing an unpleasant but financially lucrative job. 
Consider the experience of George Fox, the founder of Quakerism, which William 
James cites in The Varieties of Religious Experience. Fox claimed that he found 
himself compelled by God to walk shoeless through the city of Lichfeld decrying 
it as “bloody”, and experienced a vision of “a channel of blood running down the 
streets, and the market-place...like a pool of blood”140 Such an experience does 
not seem qualitatively pleasant or enjoyable, but Fox obviously viewed it in a 
positive light, a necessary part of his role as a messenger of God. As Kenneth 
Kensinger concludes in his study of Peruvian shamanic ritual: “If they find it so 
unpleasant, so fearful, why do they persist in using the drug? The answer lies in 
the relevance of the hallucinations for personal action.”141 In cases such as that of 
Fox, positive feelings stem from a sense of being enlightened or in a privileged 
relationship with the deity or ultimate reality; in those cited by Kensinger, positive 
feelings stem from awareness of the practical utility of the experience, the power 
it allows an individual to attain over others and the physical world. Returning to 
Jackson and Fulford‟s psychiatric focus, a subject experiencing genuinely 
pathological psychoses will not view them as positive or desirable, and as useless 
states, even if he lacks the insight to recognise them as potential symptoms of a 
mental illness. Such a subject is languishing, and his experience holds no value 
for him.  
 A mystical experience‟s effect on the subjective well-being of its subject is 
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a vital component in determining its value. However, as I mention above, this is 
not enough for an intellectually robust epistemology. Although I can tolerate the 
kind of pluralism suggested by James, relativism is anathema. This examination 
needs to go deeper than asking “did you like it?”. If it was simply a case of feeling 
positive about the experience, then we would be forced to conclude that all 
manner of feigned, artificial and trivial mystical experiences are indeed valuable. 
Action-enhancement and empowerment are not purely subjective notions, or at 
least if they were they would have little meaning as concepts, but how do we go 
about framing them with objective criteria? Mystical experience may enable many 
types of action. Saint Theresa of Avila was inspired by her experiences to live a 
life of greater moral perfection. Gautama Buddha sought to eliminate human 
suffering. Jess Byron Hollenback, in his book Mysticism: Experience, Response, 
and Empowerment, focuses on mystics who exhibit parapsychological abilities 
such as clairvoyance and ex-stasis (out of body experience). Ecuadorian shamans 
undertake mystical quests in order to heal the sick.
142
 From this tiny sample, it is 
clear that activity inspired or caused by mystical experience ranges from the 
abstractly spiritual to the conspicuously practical. What is the unifying factor 
linking such divergent phenomena? Quite simply, there is no one factor that can 
be identified. What all cases of empowerment should have in common, however, 
is that a subject feels the action was necessitated by the mystical experience, 
views this relationship in a positive light, and the action must provide or 
contribute to the attributes featured in the definition of mental health quoted by 
Keyes. Here I should emphasise that I do not desire a concept of empowerment 
that is solely medical or psychiatric in its focus; however, I do believe that such 
qualities constitute a type of heuristic in determining whether an individual is 
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flourishing or languishing, as Keyes suggests. In other words, although a valuable 
mystical experience should contribute to a subject‟s mental health, it should also 
be functioning on a much wider scale. In a similar fashion, although the subject‟s 
subjective well-being is a vital part of his being empowered, empowerment is 
about much more than “feeling good‟. We should expect true empowerment (and 
true subjective well-being too) to translate into tangible, objective results that 
assist in the goal of flourishing. Real meaning must yield such an effect. 
 At this point, I can state my definition of a valuable mystical experience, 
slightly modified from the one given by Jackson and Fulford: 
A mystical experience is valuable (spiritual) for a subject S if its 
content is action-enhancing for S, and S views the enhanced action 
as positive. 
Note that flourishing is not explicitly included in the definition as it should 
be considered as a wider state of affairs. Being empowered in a certain 
respect does not necessarily constitute S‟s state of flourishing, rather, it 
contribute to S‟s flourishing. 
 There is one type of action that requires discussion. The history of religion 
is littered with martyrs, flagellants, and ascetics: those who willingly harm or even 
kill themselves in the name of religion. How does such action contribute to their 
flourishing? I am willing to argue that if the self-destructive mystic feels positive 
about their course of action, and it assists in achieving some greater good, either 
for themselves, others, or both, then it is empowered action. Self-destruction with 
no such purpose, however, is a prime example of what Jackson and Fulford label 
“radical failure of action”. There must be some tangible benefit to the action, in 
the sense that it can be perceived and understood in real-world terms, and is not 
purely supernatural. Self-destructive action of the empowered kind can be 
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considered as an extension of self-sacrifice. Self-sacrificial and altruistic 
behaviour is rarely deemed undesirable given the correct intentions and outcomes. 
According to my framework, a mystic who self-harms with the sole intention of 
gaining succour or forgiveness from God is not empowered; but one who does so 
for practical real-world benefit is. Examples of the latter might be a martyr who 
deliberately dies by the sword of an unjust government to draw attention to its 
iniquity and brutality, and thus motivates others in society to challenge or 
overthrow its authority, or an ascetic who engages in self-starvation or sleep 
deprivation in order to induce mystical experiences, and thus gain further 
knowledge and empowerment (assuming the knowledge gained is empowering). 
 As I noted in my discussion of flourishing, moral and ethical 
considerations cannot form part of our determination of value. There is no room 
for judgements such as “S‟s mystical experience has no value because the action 
resulting from it is morally wrong”. In addition to my previous objections 
regarding the question-begging nature of moral realism in the context of religion, 
such an attitude would, to my mind, inevitably lead to a form of religious 
exclusivism that holds one religion‟s system of morality as superior and more 
truthful than any other systems. Of course, there are moral systems without any 
religious basis, but using these to judge mystical experience returns us to 
question-begging: God or gods are not necessarily moral entities, and thus 
veridical experiences of them may not necessarily be morally correct. Although 
the content of a mystical experience and its meaning for the subject will often be 
of a moral character, the truth or falsity we perceive in such conclusions does not 
affect its value for the subject.  
 However, this should not be taken as asserting that our hands are 
completely tied when it comes to the ethically questionable mystic. All I am 
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suggesting is that moral considerations cannot affect the assessment of a mystical 
experience‟s value. We can still pass judgement on the actions enhanced or 
empowered by a mystical experience as we see fit. To analogise, a current event 
might initiate a passionate argument between a friend and I on some ethical 
matter. Our disagreement does not entail that I should dismiss his perception of or 
interpretation of the event as completely false or delusional; we simply differ on a 
point of ethics. Although current events and private mystical visions are very 
different things, my point is that I can disagree with someone without completely 
denying the personal meaning an experience has for them. The same applies to 
questions of truth value, and may help to further clarify my point. I may not agree 
with a mystic‟s claim that the apocalypse will occur on December 12 2012, but I 
can still assert that the experience which revealed the prognostication to him has 
value and meaning to him – it clearly does if he is passionately trying to convince 
myself and others of its truth, making the preparations he sees fit, and so forth. In 
this sense, it is no better or worse than any other mystical revelation. However, if 
the date passes without event, we might expect (in a fit of optimism, perhaps) that 
he would no longer value the experience himself. He prepared for a non-event and 
was made a fool of; it was all delusion. Barring an experience revealing a revised 
date, or a radical re-interpretation on his part, he can no longer take meaningful 
action, and his positive feelings regarding the experience will dissipate. To 
summarise my argument here, when a mystical experience is described as 
empowering and therefore valuable, that does not constitute endorsement of the 
experience‟s truth value or the behaviour it initiates. It is merely a judgement of 
the epistemic status of the experience using the only method that I believe is 
logically available. 
 Having given account of my definition of valuable mystical experience, I 
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will explore its operation by way of a selection of examples. The first case I will 
use for this purpose is that of Simon. 
 
Simon 
 This case is originally presented by Jackson and Fulford.
143
 Simon, a 40 
year old black American professional, was a practising Christian prior to his 
mystical experiences.  
Around four years before his first interview, his hitherto 
successful career was threatened by legal action from colleagues. 
Although he claimed to be innocent, mounting a defense would be 
expensive and hazardous. He responded to this crisis by praying at a 
small altar which he set up in his front room. After an emotional 
evening’s “outpouring”, he discovered that the candle wax had left a 
“seal” (or “sun”) on several consecutive pages of his Bible, 
covering certain letters and words...Although the marked words and 
letters had no explicit meaning, Simon interpreted this event as a 
direct communication from God, which signified that he had a 
special purpose or mission. 
After this experience, Simon continued to receive such messages, and his 
interpretations of them formed into a complex set of beliefs. He came to believe 
that he was, among other things, “captain of the guard of Israel”,144 and that the 
ultimate purpose of his revelations was to  unite Christianity and Islam. He 
appeared to view his entire life in the context of his mystical experiences, even 
regarding minor misfortunes as satanic in cause. Most people would view Simon 
as highly delusional, and he recognised that those privy to his beliefs and the 
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photographs he took of the wax revelations were generally unimpressed. 
However, when his experiences are viewed in terms of action-enhancement they 
appear highly beneficial:  
He claimed that they gave him the conviction to contest and win the 
lawsuit against him, and more generally to succeed as a high-
achieving black person in a predominantly white, racist, context. He 
had high self-esteem, firm moral convictions, and a strong sense of 
purpose in life.         
Jackson and Fulford view Simon‟s experiences as clearly action-enhancing, and I 
agree. The experiences endowed him with unusual fortitude, and he views their 
influence as positive. Although he admits being overwhelmed at times by the 
responsibility they place upon him, and being treated with scepticism by those 
whom he reveals his beliefs to, he certainly does not appear to wish that the 
experiences had never occurred. This is the sense in which I wish to use the term 
“positive” with regard to my definition, rather than in a sense synonymous with 
“pleasant” or “enjoyable”. 
 
Carol 
 The following case was originally presented by Marzanski and Bratton, as 
a counterexample to Jackson and Fulford‟s typology.145 Carol, now 67, married 
Bill when she was 27, and he was 40. In the second year of her marriage to him, 
Carol‟s husband Richard began an affair which escalated to the extent that 
Richard invited his lover Sophie and her children to live with Carol and himself. 
After seven years of this, Carol had a nervous breakdown. 
She claimed that God had visited her and had told her that some 
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“nice people” would take her away. She began wandering along the 
streets looking for these nice people, but never met them despite 
messages from cars, stars, shop windows, and church bells left for 
her in various places. Eventually she was admitted to the psychiatric 
hospital in a stupor. She was successfully treated with antipsychotic 
medication and discharged. She returned to a new house, purchased 
by her husband and stayed there alone for the next 8 years. In 1991, 
Sophie left Richard for another man and Richard returned to Carol. 
Soon afterwards, Carol had her second nervous breakdown. 
Carol is still living with Richard, who now has arthritis and is dependent upon 
Carol for care. She sees this provision of care as her duty as a spouse, and believes 
that Richard is genuinely sorry for his treatment of her, but is readmitted to the 
psychiatric hospital every year due to a relapse in her condition. However, despite 
her attempts to escape from Richard while experiencing psychosis, once treated 
she inevitably returns to him. 
 While they claim Jackson and Fulford would view Carol‟s experiences as 
action-destructive and hence pathological, Marzanski and Bratton take a wider 
view of her spirituality that includes her faith and duty to her husband as 
manifestations of her spiritual character. They suggest such strength of character 
may be enhanced by her mystical experiences, “perhaps by giving her respite from 
the difficulties of domestic life.”146 However, I would say that Carol‟s experiences 
do not appear valuable, and that Marzanski and Bratton‟s argument is extremely 
speculative given that they do not indicate what Carol‟s feelings are regarding her 
mystical episodes and wider religious practices. Once treated, Carol‟s behaviour 
returns to its regular pattern, and she resumes her relationship with Richard. If the 
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content of the experiences was valuable to her, I would expect that she might act 
upon the suggestion contained in them that there is a better life waiting for her 
outside of her marriage to Richard, or she might at least recognise that they appear 
to be indicative of how much stress the marriage places on her. Instead of using 
the experiences as the basis for an improved, goal-oriented, potentially flourishing 
life, they are cast aside as symptoms of a periodic mental illness.  
  
Mark 
 This is a case of my own devising that demonstrates another type of non-
valuable mystical experience. It also links with the problems of asceticism I 
considered previously. 
 Mark has a general interest in things spiritual. This leads him learn a set of 
meditation techniques. While meditating by himself one day, he has a mystical 
experience in which feels himself in contact with a force that underlies all reality, 
determining and causing all events in the universe. This force exerts a sensation of 
total inner peace upon Mark, and he perceives it as more real and meaningful than 
anything else he has ever experienced. Mark finds that by practising his 
meditation, he can connect with this force as he wishes. He values these 
experiences so much that he begins to devote his entire life to them, and begins to 
mediate for several hours every day. He loses interest in all else, to the extent that 
he neglects his job and spends little time in the company of others due to his 
preference for meditation. Although he is cognisant of the destructive influence 
his meditation has on his regular life, he views it as merely a dream in comparison 
with the hyperreality of his meditation experiences. When confronted by friends 
and family who go as far to suggest that meditation is ruining his life, he often 
examines his choices, but always concludes that he is overwhelmingly happy with 
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his life and certainly does not wish that he had never his mystical revelations. 
 Although Mark expresses positive feelings about his experience, it is not 
action-enhancing. Despite his claims that he is in contact with the fundamental 
reality underlying the physical world, it has no effect on his nonmystical life. To 
be considered valuable, it would have to satisfy this condition. Additionally, 
because of this dearth of tangible effect, Mark‟s meditative practices represent a 
form of self-destructive action that fails the test of value. He is certainly not on a 
path to flourishing, despite his claim of happiness. However, we can imagine a 
slightly different scenario, where the insights revealed by meditation inspire Mark 
to live more compassionately towards others, or educate others on the joys of 
meditation. If he acts on these inspirations, then his experience would be valuable.   
 
 At this stage we may ask a series of related questions. Why can mystical 
experience be action-enhancing? Why is it such a powerful force in human lives, 
in the brain, and across the breadth of history? Why is it such a force that an 
adamant secularist such as John Dewey recognised the extraordinary power and 
utility of religious motivation and emotion, while at the same time decrying any 
belief in the supernatural? Perhaps if we can understand the role and mechanism 
of mystical experience throughout human society, we can give a better account of 
just how and what a valuable mystical experience is. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
In the search for an externalised, objective criterion by which to determine the 
value of mystical experiences, grounds of evolutionary adaptation appear to offer 
a possible solution. Certainly, given the link I have drawn between valuable 
mystical experience and a nonmoral concept of flourishing, perhaps mystical 
experience assists “to instantiate the life form of that species”,147 much like other 
adaptations. If religious beliefs, practices and institutions comprise or facilitate 
fitness-enhancing traits, and mystical experience has a central role in the origin 
and perpetuation of religion, then mystical experiences that demonstrate certain 
characteristics will be valuable as adaptive tools.  
 This is an enticing prospect, and reveals a potentially robust account of 
mystical experience which would place it within a context of the established 
scientific corpus without dismissing it as mere neuropathic folly. However, my 
rather convoluted description of how mystical experience could be interpreted as 
fitness-enhancing reveals several questions that must be addressed before we can 
welcome mystical experience as an adaptive mechanism. To begin, how important 
is mystical experience and mystical tradition to human religion as a whole? Does 
religion find its roots in the mental journeys of Neolithic visionaries and shamans? 
Even if evidence confirms this in the affirmative, do modern-day mystical 
experiences have a viable relationship with institutionalized religion, or are they a 
relic from a world without systematised theology and religious inquiry? These 
questions aside, does religion in general confer evolutionary advantage? Is it 
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hardwired into our genetic heritage, is it a purely cultural adaptation, is it a by-
product of adaptations? Perhaps it is in fact the opposite of an adaptation, 
particularly in the context of today‟s scientific and technological advances.  
Unfortunately, what appeared at first to be a simple and scientifically sound 
epistemic approach to mystical experience reveals itself as an ever-deepening 
wormhole. However, it is my belief that its exploration will provide a rich source 
of answers to the riddles of mystical experience, even if the solution beckoning 
me into the wormhole proves illusory. 
 Firstly, how might religion be considered an evolutionary adaptation, 
conferring an advantage on those who practise it? In his book Breaking The Spell, 
Daniel Dennett gives three basic adaptations religion has been interpreted as 
providing.
148
 The first two are psychological, positing religious beliefs as an 
inevitable consequence of the vicissitudes of human nature. Maybe religion 
provides comfort in the face of anxiety regarding death or the difficulties of life.  
Life often appears as a series of struggles and tribulations, only to be ended by 
untimely death. Particularly for Neolithic humans in whom we might assume 
religion first developed, Hobbes‟ description of life as essentially “solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short” might be exceedingly accurate. In the context of such an 
existence, religion provides a sense of control, or assuages suffering “by the 
promise of a better life or of salvation”.149 In a similar fashion, the difficulties 
created by the human ability to consider his own mortality are said to be 
countered by religion. Religious beliefs may promise some form of immortality, 
or an afterlife superior to earthly existence. Death ceases to be, at best, an end to 
suffering. It becomes merely another step in life‟s journey, and possibly the 
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realisation of salvation. 
 Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, religion supplies explanations to 
account for phenomena that would otherwise prove incomprehensibly puzzling. I 
say additionally because it appears to me that providing explanation leads to the 
provision of comfort; for instance, religion might comfort the emotionally stricken 
survivors of a natural disaster by explaining why such suffering occurs. Lacking 
explanations, at least for certain kinds of phenomena, promotes fear and anxiety. 
Even when the questions demanding explanation are not directly related to death 
or suffering, not having answers can lead to existential anxiety. This anxiety could 
arise from a desire to understand one‟s purpose in life or solve ethical quandaries, 
or answer somewhat less grandiose questions. A need for a coherent world view is 
often seen as a common human urge, and a wide variety of matters, from love to 
dreams to the seasons need to be addressed to attain such a world view. At least 
for modern humans, doubt and the unknown seem a particularly potent source of 
fear and angst. Religion may provide certainty, a security blanket with which to 
smother a world of complex and puzzling perceptions. It is certainly comforting to 
possess assured beliefs regarding questions such as “why does life exist?” or 
“what is my purpose in life?”. From a humanist, secular, and scientifically 
informed perspective such questions may appear as absurd riddles, either 
unanswerable (your life‟s purpose is whatever you make it) or largely nonsensical 
in their simplicity (life exists because, well, it does). However, the absurdity of 
such questions shows how and why explanations could be considered useful. If 
attaining answers is impossible or an exercise in futility, and yet as humans we 
cannot resist the urge to explore such issues, having any answer provides 
certainty, allays anxiety, and precludes waste of resources debating such issues. 
This certainty of conviction also binds a religious community together with a 
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common purpose and vision, a fact that actually ties into the third purpose of 
religion discussed by Dennett, and which I will address shortly.  
 Already a problem with this purpose of religion is plain to see; why 
wouldn‟t the answer provided by a religion (that such evil is necessary in order to 
allow good things to happen, or that the disaster was retaliation from God for 
immoral behaviour, or that the disaster was caused by an malignant deity) simply 
precipitate more anxiety or doubt, or at least raise a need for higher-level 
explanations? How could one be reassured by the idea that a drought was caused 
by a witch, as opposed to just viewing it as a lack of rainfall that unfortunately 
occurs from time to time? Although it does provide a clearly prescribed remedy to 
the disaster (the witch must be exorcised or punished), who is to say more witches 
will not cause future catastrophes? Or, in the case of Christianity, how is it 
soothing that a God of pure love and omnipotent power was forced into allowing 
evil and suffering? The anxiety that is supposedly rationalised away merely 
appears elsewhere, at a higher, supernatural level which evades truly rational 
thought.  It seems that such explanations simply offer accounts that, under 
minimal scrutiny, seem to provide no actual solution at all. What they do provide 
have been described as “relevant mysteries”150 or “just-so stories”;151 explanations 
that cannot be disproven by material evidence. Even if we disregard the 
inadequacy of such explanations, the premise that there is some innate human 
need for the explanation of certain or all phenomena is doubtful. As I hinted at 
above, this might be an example of a modern scientific or philosophical mentality 
being applied universally. Pascal Boyer demonstrates that not all phenomena 
encountered by humans necessitate explanation, and that in actual fact the mind is 
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made up of multiple modules, or inference systems, designed to identify events 
that require explaining and then provide those explanations.
152
 Boyer (in addition 
to the majority of experts on the relationship between evolution and religion) 
argues that religious belief is in fact a by-product of these inference systems; they 
exist not because they hold some special explanatory power, but because they are 
an extension of the kind of concepts our minds are designed to formulate. David 
Lewis-Williams elaborates furthers on this theory, surmising that the explanatory 
order is the opposite of what is commonly supposed: “people harnessed the 
inexorable seasonal cycle to confirm the existence of supernatural beings and 
influences in which they already believed for other reasons altogether”.153 This 
appears to be a novel and yet surprisingly intuitive interpretation; rather than 
religion being necessary to explain observed phenomena, the observed 
phenomena are necessary to explain religion. 
 The third possible adaptation that Dennett discusses is social in basis. It 
has long been suggested that what religion provides is intra-group cohesion, a 
method of ensuring that a community operates effectively as a unit, with common 
ideologies and set of goals. This seems particularly plausible when one considers 
the move from small hunter-gatherer groups to large societies not necessarily 
sharing a common ancestry or ethnicity. In recent years, a theory of this type has 
gained some currency through the works of David Sloan Wilson, and his argument 
that religion developed due to the advantages it provides in the context of inter-
group competition. However, the basic idea is as old, if not older than, the 
psychological theories discussed above. Cynical freethinkers (Boyer cites Voltaire 
in his discussion) have often viewed religion as the foundation that guarantees a 
particular sociopolitical order or set of otherwise arbitrary morals. However, as 
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with the psychological theories of adaptation, what seem at first to be a persuasive 
argument appears less plausible under examination. It is clear that religious power 
is inextricably linked with political power, and that religious belief is frequently 
co-opted as a tool for the suppression of political dissent. In fact, Lewis-Williams 
supplies a reasonably convincing argument that Upper Paleolithic cave paintings 
demonstrate a religious system that created or at least perpetuated some form of 
hierarchy amongst practitioners.
154
 However, the presence of a religious hierarchy 
proves little about the relationship between it and any social hierarchy or order. 
Boyer argues that those asserting that religious systems are always linked to the 
maintenance of political control or oppression are guilty of an ethnocentric bias, 
and place too much emphasis on the role of Christianity in the past two millennia. 
Indeed, history inevitably focuses upon the larger and more prevailing societies in 
which a close relationship between political and religious power is necessary for 
social stability. For example, explorers returning from South America would be 
much more likely to give accounts of the Mayan or Incan cultures as opposed to 
smaller Amazonian communities, if for no other reason than the former were 
much more prevalent and thus more likely to be encountered. In smaller 
communities, religious and political power do not seem so closely seated. For 
example, amongst the Jivaro people of the Ecuadorian Amazon, approximately 
one in every four men is a shaman.
155
 Thus religious power is hardly limited to a 
privileged elite, and the power in question is not some special anointing from the 
deity, rather a special set of supernatural skills; a Jivaro shaman is more like a 
doctor than a priest. This emphasis on healing is common across what we would 
call folk religions, and will be discussed further shortly.  
 In fact, as with the theory that religion was necessitated by a human need 
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to explain observed phenomena, perhaps the actual order is the opposite. Extant 
religious belief is co-opted to provide political and social stability, rather than 
being invented for the purpose. This is supported by Boyer‟s observation that 
common features are shared by all religions, regardless of differences in social 
structure, hierarchy and levels of oppression. A brief look at major historical 
episodes in the relationship between politics and religion supports such a 
conclusion. Constantine converted the Roman Empire to Christianity for reasons 
of political expediency, as did Henry VIII in the formation of the Protestant 
Church of England. Their attitudes to religion seem to be as something that is 
necessary, and in fact unavoidable, but also a source of difficulty, a beast that can 
turn on its master as easily as serve it. Religion is not some conspiratorial political 
invention. 
 With regards to morality, the same argument can be advanced. Boyer notes 
that “all societies have some prescriptive rules that underpin social organisation 
but their religious concepts are very diverse”.156 Despite this latter diversity, some 
basic moral laws appear to be shared across all cultures, perhaps revealing an 
underlying “universal grammar”157 of morality intrinsic to the brain. Respect and 
kindness towards others, or at least those within one‟s society, seems the most 
obvious universal moral. Certain “sinful” behaviours also appear to be proscribed 
across all cultures: gluttony, greed, selfishness, and lack of humility.
158
 Once 
again, perhaps it is safer to assume that morality, at least in the form of some basic 
ethical instincts, preceded religion, or existed prior to religious justification of its 
reality. 
 Traditionally, the above theories were interpreted as providing 
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evolutionary advantage on an individual level. On this view, religion underpins 
morality or social structure, and the co-operation and/or altruism provided allows 
longer, more productive lives. Yet this idea is problematic. What about the 
members of society that inevitably violate the rules laid down by political, moral, 
or religious authority? If they can do so without earning reproach or punishment, 
it will probably prove to their advantage. If the church requires me to tithe, but I 
lie about my income and yet still reap the full benefits that the church provides, I 
have an instant advantage over my honest fellow citizens. David Sloan Wilson, for 
whom this “freeloader” problem is a central concern, expresses it using an 
example of birds who call to alert other members of their flock that a predator is 
approaching:  
 The most vigilant individuals will not necessarily survive and 
reproduce better than the least vigilant. If scanning the horizon 
detracts from feeding, the most vigilant birds will gather less food 
than their oblivious neighbours. If uttering a cry attracts the 
attention of the predator, then sentinels place themselves at risk by 
warning others. Birds that do not scan the horizon and that remain 
silent when they see a predator may well survive and reproduce 
better than their vigilant neighbours.
159
      
  
 This example of Wilson‟s is more problematic than the one supplied by 
me, as it is doubtful whether the freeloaders in the flock are punished by the birds 
who maintain vigilance. Contrast this with the denunciation and ostracism faced 
by one who is found to be tithing dishonestly. Nonetheless, given the threat of 
freeloading, how do social groupings retain their integrity and avoid failing in a 
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maelstrom of self-interest?  
 Wilson believes he has the solution to this quandary. A group of individual 
beings, “once they become sufficiently dependent upon each other”,160 actually 
function as a larger organism. This allows for a theory of natural selection that 
applies to such groups, or “multilevel selection”. According to Wilson‟s theory, a 
trait such as religion exists because it enhances a group‟s evolutionary fitness by 
promoting co-operation, solidarity, and sharing of resources. Freeloading is 
demonstrated as a negative behaviour because it decreases a group‟s fitness and 
ability to compete effectively with other groups. Hence, it is bad for me to tithe 
dishonestly because it increases my individual fitness at the expense of the 
group‟s fitness, and likewise with the bird that provides no predator alert. If 
adaptation and selection only applied at the individual level, such behaviours are 
not as common as they should be, and freeloading should spread throughout the 
group. However, this doesn‟t appear to be the case, because groups in which this 
occur are quickly forced into extinction. Wilson is fond of imagining human 
societies as beehives; superorganisms working towards one shared goal. He 
believes that religion supplies this goal:  
A given religion adapts its members to their local environment, 
enabling them to achieve by collective action what they cannot 
achieve alone or even together in the absence of religion...when 
examined closely most of them will make sense as part of a “social 
psychology” that coordinates action and solves the all-important 
problem of cheating from within.
161
   
To extend Wilson‟s beehive analogy, perhaps religion and belief in gods are like a 
queen bee: the reason for all societal structure and action, and essential for the 
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preservation of a group‟s genetic heritage (even if though many workers never 
come face to face with her). Although Wilson‟s theory of multilevel selection 
seems plausible, and to my mind, attractive (as it would thus suggest how 
mystical experience is an evolutionary adaptation), does it stand up to scrutiny? 
 Both Wilson‟s arguments and use of evidence appear to be somewhat 
suspect. In Darwin’s Cathedral he considers the obvious objection from 
traditional evolutionary theory that groups form because of the advantages they 
provide to individuals, and not because of group-level selection. However, on his 
interpretation of such an argument, it is contested that such groups are formed and 
persist because they provide special advantage to particular members who hold 
positions of power or influence. Here there appears to be some disconnect 
between his likening of human societies to superorganisms such as beehives; why 
don‟t they exist because belonging is the best choice for each individual member, 
and not because of some malignant, controlling influence? Animals such as 
wildebeest do not form into groups because the strong members know that the 
weaker individuals will be picked off first by predators, as forming a herd works 
to the advantage of even the weakest. Indeed, it becomes clear at this point that 
such analogies between human and animal social groups are not ideal: are human 
socio-political structures comparable to animal societies? Once religion becomes 
involved, they becomes even more strained. Religion is so much more complex 
than being merely a tool to guarantee social cohesion.  
 The objection above that religion provides special advantages for those in 
power creates a straw man for Wilson: clearly social groups do provide benefits to 
the group as a whole, and not just the leaders. But why not simply focus on 
individual advantages rather than those of the group? Wilson believes that such a 
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focus commits what he calls the “averaging fallacy”.162 Returning to his bird 
example, we can compare two flocks of birds: one with nine callers and one non-
calling freeloader, and the other with one caller and nine freeloaders. When the 
chances of survival for both groups are aggregated and averaged out, it is clear 
that the callers have a much better chance at survival than the non-callers. The 
freeloaders in the second group do not do nearly as well as the single freeloader in 
the first group, simply because not enough of them are able or willing to draw 
attention to danger.  This seems to indicate that such altruistic behaviour is 
advantageous on the individual level. However, Wilson points out that if 
individual selection is the only factor at play, then the freeloading phenotype will 
gradually proliferate. It follows that group selection must be the mechanism that 
allows groups to form and persist.  Yet Wilson is wrong to be so dismissive of the 
“averaging fallacy” and the role of individual selection in a group context. What 
game theories such as the averaging model show us is that there is a tipping point 
at which freeloading ceases to be so significantly adaptive for individuals. If the 
freeloading phenotype becomes too prevalent within the group, it no longer gives 
the same advantage, and it becomes clear that a greater frequency of co-operative 
and altruistic behaviour would be to the individual advantage of each member. 
Multilevel selection need not be the explanation for this: Scott Atran states that 
altruism and co-operation “may actually be a naturally selected response to distant 
rewards”.163 Such distant rewards include the benefits reaped from the reciprocal 
behaviours of other members of the group; group behaviour does not necessitate 
group selection. 
 Atran also takes major issue with Wilson‟s use of anthropological 
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evidence. According to Atran, such studies “place informants on their best 
behaviour”,164 producing an account of the society in question that may greatly 
overestimate the voluntary status of altruism and co-operation. Atran quotes 
Nicholas Peterson‟s work on sharing within Australian Aboriginal communities, 
noting that “much giving and sharing is in response to direct verbal and/or 
nonverbal demands”.165 Peterson construes such sharing as not altruism as is 
commonly conceived; rather, it is “tolerated theft”.166 He also notes that this 
model of behaviour is widespread throughout hunter-gatherer societies, and that 
pure altruism and voluntary generosity are concepts often attributed to such 
communities as part of a “noble savage” narrative. Most interestingly, however, is 
the way in which Peterson characterises “demand sharing” as a secular activity. 
Nowhere is it mentioned as being necessitated by religious practice, ritual, or 
belief; demands are initiated due to family relationships or civil customs. On this 
view, social structure does not appear to be dependent upon religion, even in 
hunter-gatherer communities. According to Wilson‟s theory, we should expect 
such societies to be dependent on religion to supply a rigid framework for 
adaptive behaviour. Again, it seems that religion may be in some way 
supervenient on social structure. Social cohesion would exist without religion, and 
religion may tie itself into that cohesion, after the fact, as a way of providing 
legitimacy for itself. 
 A major problem with the concept of social cohesion as the essential 
function of religion appears in Wilson‟s book Evolution for Everyone. Wilson 
distinguishes between what he labels the “horizontal” and “vertical” dimensions 
of religion. The former is practical knowledge, a code for how to behave in 
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everyday life and society. The latter is the supernatural aspect of religion, a code 
for understanding the mysteries of life. Wilson puzzles over this question: “What 
accounts for the linkage between the frequently crazy-appearing vertical 
dimension and the immensely practical horizontal dimension of religion?”167 He 
doesn‟t seem to find an solution above a simple answer that the two dimensions 
“are linked by our mental processes”.168 In other words, the vertical dimension is 
a by-product of the adaptive horizontal dimension. This seems highly implausible 
to me, and where Wilson‟s theory of religion begins to truly unravel. The 
supernatural features contained within every religion are a vital, definitive feature 
of it. They are not something that could be discarded in the way Wilson suggests 
they could, if only we could escape our meddling neurology. Wilson appears 
somewhat cognisant of this when he points out that “major religious traditions 
such as Buddhism and Confucianism come close to my ideal religion by providing 
strong horizontal dimensions with vertical dimensions that adhere closely to 
factual realism”.169 In other words, some religions contain minimal emphasis on 
the supernatural. However, this is completely incorrect: what religions such as 
Buddhism lack is a concept of the supernatural as characterised by Judeo-
Christian tradition. This differing concept of the supernatural is what causes 
Buddhism to be, or at least appear to be, closer to “factual realism” as Wilson puts 
it, as there are no spirits or mythologies that are irreconcilable with scientific 
belief. However, one only needs to study the rich and ongoing mystical traditions 
of such religions to realise that the supernatural remains a central force within 
them. This brings us back to my central theme: why do such mystical traditions 
exist? Although I clearly believe that they are central to religion, what is their 
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purpose? 
 My exploration of religion, and thus mysticism, as an evolutionary 
adaptation has born little fruit thus far. Nonetheless, given the larger context of my 
argument that mysticism is a pragmatic tool, necessity demanded its examination. 
As we have seen, many of the common accounts describing the existence and use 
of religion are, under scrutiny, implausible. Indeed, the inverse of such theories 
often appears to be true. Religion is a post hoc explanation for phenomena, and 
uses these explanatory abilities as a means of justifying itself.
170
 Nonetheless, 
religion does exist for a reason, even if it is not a direct evolutionary adaptation.  
 Theorists such as Dennett, Atran and Boyer advance the most plausible 
arguments regarding the cause and origin of religion. According to them, religion 
is a by-product of various adaptive modules in the human brain that organise 
received perceptual data and create functional mental patterns and models. 
Crucially, such theories do not conceive religion as a monolithic entity, a singular 
species of human behaviour with one guiding principle. As Atran states, “cultures 
and religions are not ontologically distinct „superorganisms‟ or „independent 
variables‟ with precise contents or boundaries”.171 (The divergence from Wilson‟s 
approach could not be more apparent; perhaps herein lies the reason he struggled 
to reconcile the horizontal and vertical dimensions of religion) Instead, what we 
call religion is a family of beliefs and behaviours that are diverse in origin and 
character but which share a common attribute in being directed toward the 
supernatural, or, to use slightly different terminology, “ultimate reality” or 
“ground or power of being”.172 However, even these broad attempts to define 
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religion appear stretched in the face of the “unfamiliar diversity”173 noted by 
Boyer. 
 What are these mental modules that give rise to religious belief? Firstly, 
the human brain features a sophisticated ability to attribute agency and intentions 
to entities. This module evolved as an aid in identifying predators and prey, and 
being able to understand their goals and intentions. However, evolutionary 
pressures resulted in a “hyperactive agent detection device”,174 because, in 
Boyer‟s words, “it is far more advantageous to over-detect agency than it is to 
under-detect it.”175 Humans are capable of observing complex phenomena and 
patterns, and awareness of such concepts often demands “action in response to 
those concepts”.176 Here we can see the beginnings of systematic religious belief; 
what Dennett calls “practical animism...arguably not mistakes at all, but extremely 
useful ways of keeping track of the tendencies of designed things, living or 
artifactual”.177 It also becomes apparent why the argument from design remains so 
intuitively forceful for many people, as agency detection is deeply hardwired into 
the brain. Atran observes that the hyperactive agent detection device accounts for 
the common belief that religion exists as an explanatory or comforting force, 
because humans “are cognitively susceptible to invoke supernatural agents 
whenever emotionally eruptive events arise that have superficial characteristics of 
telic event structures with no apparent controlling force”.178 Monumental, life-
altering, and yet mysterious and uncontrollable events such as natural disasters, 
disease and childbirth act as triggers for agency detection. Note, however, that this 
contrasts with the idea that the purpose of religion in is to provide such 
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explanations; religion remains a by-product of the “hair trigger”179 agency 
detection module that evolved to recognise the presence of predators and prey. 
 A second feature of the brain that reinforces the existence of supernatural 
agents and a supernatural realm is the ability to enter into altered states of 
consciousness. As was noted previously, David Lewis-Williams noted similarities 
shared amongst such states that demonstrate that they are not “culturally 
determined...[r]ather, they are wired into the neurology of the human brain.”180 
Whether it be through dreams or full-scale hallucinations, such states suggest a 
world of mysterious power and truth beyond that of our ordinary perceptions. 
Note that I am not arguing for some type of singular “God-module” within the 
brain (although few contemporary neurotheologians hold such a simplified view 
anyway).
181
 Rather, my point is that human consciousness regularly encompasses 
realms that appear beyond nature. Particularly when formally incorporated into 
religious ritual and exegesis, altered states of consciousness comprise a highly 
effective feedback loop that confirms belief, an interface between the natural and 
the supernatural, “some sort of trafficking with supernatural forces or beings”.182 
Dreams appear to play an important role in the brain, probably in reinforcing new 
memories and consolidating such new facts with the extant neural network, 
although there are also alternative theories such as brain detoxification or tissue 
restoration.
183
 Regardless of which of these theories are true, it appears that the 
experiential content of dreams is simply a by-product of the adaptive underlying 
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physical mechanism.
184
 When it comes to altered states classified by Lewis-
Williams as “intensified”, unanswered questions regarding the possible 
evolutionary role of such mystical altered states are what bought me to this point, 
and therefore it would be premature to state whether they are pure by-product; 
however, it should be clear by now in what direction I am tending.   
 Dennett argues for hypnotisability as a third adaptive module of which 
religion is a by-product. In early religion, the primary role of a priest and shaman 
was as a healer; such religions can still be found today in the Amazon, for 
instance. Such figures derive their healing power largely from taking advantage of 
the placebo effect that humans are so susceptible to. Those who are most prone to 
its influence (Dennett claims about fifteen percent of humans demonstrate “strong 
hypnotizability”)185 reap full benefit from the shaman‟s treatment, and thus 
possess an evolutionary advantage over those who are less suggestible. Shamanic 
healing, as a primitive yet somewhat effective form of health care, “could have 
created a strong ridge of selection pressure that would not otherwise have been 
there.”186  The power of the psyche is well known in contemporary medicine, even 
in the face of serious illnesses such as cancer, and even more so with regard to 
childbirth, which is cited by Dennett as being a primary health concern in 
premodern times. Under this view, being susceptible to hypnotism and induced 
trances was accompanied by the by-product of religious belief. To put it another 
way, religious content supervened upon hypnotic healing rituals, and those 
susceptible to the hypnosis were more suggestible and willing to accept the truth 
of that content. 
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 The final evolutionary adaptation that religion is a by-product of relates to 
the transmission of messages and facts via oral culture. Atran and Ara Norenzayan 
demonstrate via empirical study that minimally counterintuitive statements, such 
as the disembodied beings and talking animals one finds in mythology, “may have 
a potent survival advantage over intuitive beliefs: once processed and recalled, 
they degrade less than intuitive ones.”187 These counterintuitive statements, that 
initiate and/or reinforce belief in a supernatural world outside of ordinary intuition 
and perception, are what Dennett labels “memory-engineering devices”.188 A 
mythology featuring the right amount of “combinations of explicit violation and 
tacit inference” reaches a “memory optimum”,189 and will efficiently serve as a 
vector for transmitting and preserving extremely valuable cultural, ethical, and 
even scientific knowledge across the ages amongst oral cultures with no other 
method of retaining knowledge other than the art of storytelling. In addition to 
being memorable, the mysterious absurdity of counterintuitive beliefs means that 
“there is no recourse but memorization”190 for the listener, and therefore 
discourages use of artistic license in their retelling, which would risk the gradual 
degradation of the message underlying the myth. Once again, religion is not 
essential to this mechanism – any counterfactuals could be utilised to create these 
mnemonics – but a feedback loop is created in which nascent supernatural forms 
and ideas are incorporated into a cultural narrative, and then confirmed as true by 
virtue of their vital role within that narrative. 
 If religion is an evolutionary by-product and not itself adaptive, what of 
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mystical experience? The above accounts of dreams and some forms of ritualised 
hypnosis demonstrate how certain kinds of altered states of consciousness are 
adaptive, but do not include the significant majority of mystical experiences, and 
more importantly, assert that the religious content of these mechanisms is an 
unnecessary by-product. However, the question of whether a cultural trait is an 
evolutionary adaptation is not the be-all and end-all of its value, and religious 
belief, even as a by-product, does have strong links to adaptive behaviours. 
Furthermore, I believe that mystical experience has played a crucial role in the 
historical development of religion, and that it may also be important to human 
development in ways not directly linked to religion. 
 As noted above, Lewis-Williams argues for altered states of consciousness 
as essential to the genesis of religion. Without them, he claims, it would not be 
possible for “people everywhere to suspect the existence of an unseen realm”.191 
Similar assertions are made by several others.
192
 According to such theories, 
religion is either directly sourced from altered states of consciousness, or a 
somewhat weaker claim is made that such states are necessary to provide 
experiential confirmation of the supernatural beliefs suggested by other 
conceptual modules. However, such arguments appear problematic, as it is far 
from clear that mystical experiences or even significant alterations of 
consciousness were common in early human societies. Boyer and Brian 
Bergstrom note that “[i]n all modern groups, such states are exceptional in one‟s 
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lifetime and are typically the preserve of specialists or particular subgroups”.193 If 
mystical experience is what justifies religious belief by supplying an experiential 
basis, then it needs to be something that is experienced by more than a privileged 
or exceptional few. This is true; the kinds of experiences described by Meister 
Eckhart, R.M. Bucke or Carlos Castaneda are not commonly experienced. Indeed, 
their scarcity combined with their universality is what makes them of such 
remarkable interest.  
 In the case of Lewis-Williams‟ argument, however, this objection 
overlooks his particular theory of consciousness and what constitutes an altered 
state. As described previously, Lewis-Williams views consciousness as a spectrum 
or continuum, rather than a set of discrete values denoting “ordinary” and 
“altered”. Therefore the altered states of consciousness necessary for religious 
belief need not be the kind that are the almost exclusive focus of mystical 
literature; Lewis-Williams‟ theory includes “other, milder, mental states that many 
people would not consider „altered‟”.194 He describes such “milder” states as 
“shifting consciousness”,195 including dreams and waking reveries of imagination 
under its circumscription. Add to these “sensations of religious exaltation”196 and 
the “numinous” experiences of “awefulness” and the sublime originally given 
serious consideration by Rudolf Otto‟s The Idea of the Holy.197 All such various 
altered states allow an awareness of a perceived supernatural realm or at least a 
world much larger and more complex than is revealed by ordinary experience. In 
fact, Lewis-Williams argues that interpreting dreams and other “aberrant 
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experiences”198 in such a way comprises an evolutionary adaptation of sorts, as it 
is a means of reconciling them with normal perceptual experience, “a ready-made 
framework for sorting out the different kinds of experiences that everyone has”.199 
It is certainly not uncommon for individuals to experience a sense of heightened 
religious awareness or exaltation during rituals or in places of worship; nor is it 
uncommon for individuals to place special, even prophetic, emphasis on particular 
dreams. Additionally, both Lewis-Williams and Otto observe that such feelings of 
religious or transcendent awareness, a shift in consciousness, can take place 
outside of religious contexts, and without being tied to any religious system. 
Howard Wettstein supplies multiple examples of this type of naturalistic 
awareness, whether it be awe of natural or human grandeur.
200
  
 Although massive, hallucinatory changes in consciousness are not 
necessary to gain a glimpse of the supernatural realm that is the domain of 
religion, the power of such experiences should not be denied. Little can equal 
them for belief and life-altering effect. This can be observed in the ways that, 
throughout history, the ability to induce major alterations of consciousness has 
been a remarkable tool in promulgating particular religions. If such experiences 
can be ritually induced on a consistent basis across a group, such rituals become a 
powerful tool in both conversion and in reinforcing faith and belief. For instance, 
the “Peyote Religion” of native Americans, a variant of which Carlos Castaneda 
reported being initiated in, spread from northwestern Mexico to as far north as 
Saskatchewan during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, arguably due to its 
inclusive and emotionally powerful shamanic rituals.
201
 Another example is the 
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Pentecostal movement, a Christian denomination which places great emphasis on 
ritualised episodes of glossolalia (speaking in tongues), which are interpreted as a 
channelling of supernatural or ancient languages and evidence of an individual‟s 
blessing by God.
202
 It has spread rapidly throughout the USA and the world over 
the past century, and when compared with other forms of Christianity, “can be 
counted as one of the great success stories of the current era of globalization”.203 
If these cultivated mystical experiences are such a powerful force, however, why 
are they not more prevalent? Why did religions with such rituals not consistently 
outcompete those without them? The answer to this question may lie in the fact 
that the promulgation of radical mystical experiences, particularly amongst the 
general congregation, can be damaging to the structural and doctrinal stability of a 
religion. This is especially true in the case of large religions that also operate as 
socio-political institutions. Placing such an emphasis on individual experience and 
insight is thus a dangerous game, with equal risks and rewards. A more moderate 
approach is to retain a default attitude of scepticism, or even outward distrust of 
such radical alterations of consciousness and rely on lesser forms of “shifting 
consciousness” to supply a sense of the reality of the supernatural. These lesser 
forms still provide supernatural awareness, without having quite the same explicit 
“noetic quality” described by James.204   
 These altered states of conciousness, wherever they might fall on the 
spectrum devised by Lewis-Williams, serve as a method of reifying information 
provided by the other conceptual modules of the brain. Although thus far my 
emphasis has been on the first-hand experience, observing or hearing reports of 
others‟ altered state experiences also contributes to an acceptance of a 
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supernatural reality, particularly in the context of group ritual. For instance, seeing 
others speaking in tongues confirms your glossolalia as not unfounded; it allows a 
sense of intersubjectivity. A prophet or shaman recalling his vision has a similar 
effect. Such experiences work to quieten sceptical thoughts and reinforce the 
belief that the religious truths in question are not just in the head.  
 As observed previously, altered states of consciousness form a feedback 
loop of being somewhat initiated by and yet also confirming beliefs in the 
supernatural. But although the hyperactive agent detection device preceded altered 
states of consciousness (even invertebrates with little consciousness to speak of 
display simple kinds of agency awareness), mystical experience probably 
preceded the other adaptations that religion is a by-product of. It definitely entered 
the scope of human behaviour before the hypnosis method of healing, if we make 
the assumption that the practice began as a shamanic healing ritual, thus creating 
the “strong ridge of selection pressure” that lead to such rituals becoming 
widespread. Given that such rituals, at least as they are observed in contemporary 
societies,
205
 are attempts to diagnose and/or cure ailments by supernatural and/or 
magical means, it seems implausible that they originally existed without such 
mystical content.  
 Similarly, although perhaps less certainly, it seems that altered states of 
consciousness were the original source of doctrine and prophecy, and in particular 
the counterintuitive elements of mythology that made such stories so readily 
transmissible. Altered states of consciousness, at least in the form of REM dream 
sleep, occur in most mammals,
206
 and as such predate language and religion in the 
brain. Once humans began to become aware of simple religious concepts and a 
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differentiation of natural and supernatural, a “universe full of mystery”,207 looking 
to mystical experience for the truths of that universe that lay beyond ordinary 
human knowledge was a natural solution. Also worth consideration here are 
Lewis-Williams‟ descriptions of the “vortex” and “flight” as reoccurring themes in 
intensified altered states of consciousness,
208
 experiences which suggest venturing 
beyond or above normal perception to a position where special knowledge or even 
absolute truth is revealed. The content of these experiences could then be 
combined or reconciled with existing folk knowledge to form doctrine, 
mythology, and cosmology. With the right combination of practical folk wisdom 
and counterintuitive statements, such a doctrine could prove its use and maintain 
integrity over many generations. 
 Perhaps, at this point, a schematic of how basic human consciousness 
developed systematised religious belief can begin to be formulated. It might be 
something like this: Base consciousness → Altered consciousness / Dreams / 
Imagination → Concept of the supernatural → Symbolic thought → Religious 
belief. Note that this is merely a tentative outline of how such a progression 
occurred, and is an obvious act of blatant simplification in some respects. Several 
steps are very probably the result of complex feedback loops, and suggestive of 
“chicken and egg” scenarios rather than simple antecedents and consequents. 
Nonetheless, bear with me while I offer an explanation of it. 
 The “base consciousness” that we begin with is a simple animal 
consciousness of sorts: non-reflective, non-reflexive, lacking the self-awareness 
that we refer to as part of “the human condition”. It could be compared to the 
consciousness enjoyed by Adam and Eve prior to their fall. From this stage, the 
human imagination develops as an adaptive tool. The ability to imagine is clearly 
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adaptive, as by the use of “this sort of mental manipulation a person is able to 
solve problems in the present and to decide on future behaviour”.209 Add to this an 
increasing awareness of dreams, the complexity of which may be augmented by a 
more activated and flexible imagination, and increasing awareness of potential 
altered states of consciousness, quite possibly through the discovery of 
hallucinogenic plants. Imagination and altered states of consciousness supply a 
cognisance of the supernatural, and combine with the hyperactive agent detection 
device to form a kind of proto-religion, perhaps a less systematised predecessor to 
the Upper Paleolithic animism and totemism documented by Lewis-Williams.
210  
 
Cognitive scientist Fred Previc demonstrates that the dopaminergic 
neurochemical activity observed in dreams and hallucinatory states is associated 
with increased activation of the brain‟s extrapersonal space systems.211 These 
systems comprise part of the brain‟s mechanism for orienting the body and objects 
within three-dimensional space; the focal and ambient extrapersonal systems 
activated during altered states of consciousness relate to objects beyond one‟s 
personal space (focal extrapersonal) and on or over the horizon (ambient 
extrapersonal).
212
 Dopaminergic activity, and activation of extrapersonal systems 
are also associated with an increased emphasis on abstract thinking and 
diminished scepticism. Given this evidence, it appears that altered states of 
consciousness, not merely by content but rather by their neurochemical 
configuration, facilitate a greater awareness of and belief in the supernatural and 
abstract concepts of unseen agency. In addition to this, altered states of 
consciousness and in particular the growth of imagination familiarise the mind 
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with concepts of possible worlds and counterfactuals. These thought modules, 
combined with the dopaminergic cognition Previc emphasises, would be 
necessary for the simplest ritual behaviour, behaviour that presumes some 
relationship with or ability to manipulate supernatural beings who are present yet 
undetectable, or abstract supernatural realms beyond the horizon.  
 However, before humanity could be capable of the sophisticated worship 
and ritual that makes religion so distinctive and powerful, symbolic thought is 
required. Several theorists argue that altered states of consciousness were in fact 
integral in the development of symbolic thought. Matt Rossano notes evidence 
that symbolic reference, as opposed to iconic and indexical reference, did not 
appear until the Upper Paleolithic.
213
 These different methods of reference 
originate in the semiotics of Charles Peirce.
214
 Iconic reference connects a sign 
and an object through resemblance (such as red ochre referring to blood). 
Indexical reference connects a sign and an object through some causal relationship 
(such as smoke referring to fire). Symbolic reference connects a sign and an 
object through pure convention (such as the word “lake” referring to a large body 
of water). Rossano argues that meditative “campfire rituals of focused 
attention”215 and trance-based shamanic healing rituals provided the foundation 
for and/or augmented symbolic reference capability. As evidence he cites research 
which shows that meditating subjects enjoy significantly activation in “areas of 
the frontal lobe of the brain associated with working memory and focused 
attention”,216 and that consistent practice confers major long-term benefits.217 
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These benefits, together with the rituals involved, created a significant selection 
pressure in which individuals who excelled were admired by their peers. Michael 
Winkelman makes a similar argument for shamanic altered states of consciousness 
being instrumental in the cognitive evolution of the brain. He notes that the 
“evolution of the human brain and its modular structures produced a 
fragmentation of consciousness, reflecting both the increasing modularity of 
consciousness and the diversification of self”.218 Altered states of consciousness 
reverse this fragmentation by producing “limbic system slow-wave discharges that 
synchronize the frontal cortex”219 to achieve a psychointegrative state that features 
“a synthesis of behavior, emotion, and thought.”220 This “cross-modal 
integration”,221 together with the abstract thought enabled or emphasised by 
dopaminergic activity, facilitates the complex symbolism and metaphor 
characteristic of religion. Integrated brain function across the “evolutionary 
strata”222 of separate conceptual modules is what allows otherwise ordinary 
objects, locations and animals to take on special social and mental significance as 
religious icons.  
 From this evidence, it appears that mystical experiences and altered states 
of consciousness were not only essential to the development of religion, but were 
also instrumental in human cognitive evolution. Therefore, even if it is conceded 
that religion is purely an evolutionary by-product, and confers no adaptive 
advantage at all aside from the conceptual modules it supervenes upon, mystical 
experience can still be viewed as adaptive in a separate sense. However, can it still 
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be given such status in the context of the modern brain? Does its role in cognitive 
evolution continue? Or was it merely a stepping stone to the complex symbolic 
thought we enjoy today, like an infant crawling in order to walk, a necessary relic? 
Many theorists, including Lewis-Williams and Dennett, take this latter view, 
arguing that humanity can finally break free from the yoke of religion with its 
primitive and even barbaric rituals, oppressive moral laws, and the “consciousness 
fiddling”223 of mystical experience. But is it really as simple as Lewis-Williams 
asserts? Can we keep the baby of religious history, art and literature while 
throwing out the bathwater, that ephemeral by-product of supernatural suspicion 
and yearning? In this age of science and secularism, can we really dismiss 
religious belief as the bastion of the gullible, the uneducated, the weak of heart 
and mind? Or is this the arrogance of the enlightenment all over again? Is it a 
quixotic endeavour, pitted against the enormous weight of phenomena that are 
“hardwired in the brain...always there ready to make an appearance when they are 
needed”224 and accompanied by a subjective certainty that the mystical and 
supernatural are “fundamentally more real than baseline reality”.225  
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Although I generally agree with the assertions of Lewis-Williams and Dennett that 
religion‟s influence upon modern society will inevitably diminish, I am much less 
sympathetic to the idea that its yoke can be completely cast off and relegated to 
the status of some museum exhibit. The fact remains that the capacity for religious 
and mystical experience resides deep within the brain, ready to be activated by a 
variety of factors and circumstances. No matter how much these experiences are 
marginalised or scorned, their importance to some individuals cannot be avoided. 
Even if all the world‟s religious institutions and systems of belief were 
dismantled, religious experiences would still occur and generate belief. However, 
even if the inevitability of these experiences is recognised, do we still write them 
off as a neurological artefact, a pure by-product? Or do they still have value?  
 Firstly, the practice of meditation derided by Lewis-Williams as 
“consciousness fiddling” is not deserving of such a pejorative description. Regular 
meditation is shown to “promote neural plasticity”226 (which is actually one of the 
benefits thought to be provided by dream sleep
227) and also “may slow age-related 
thinning of the frontal cortex”.228 Meditation can certainly be sheared away from 
what Lewis-Williams dubs the “embarrassing doctrines”229 of religious belief and 
cosmology, but the so-called fiddling that remains has a tendency towards 
religious and mystical insight. Even if a practitioner of meditation rejects the 
supernatural, his meditative exercises function by manipulating the same 
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cognitive modules and operators activated during religious ritual; both involve 
“intermittent emotional discharges involving the subjective sensation of awe, 
peace, tranquillity, or ecstasy, and...varying degrees of unitary experience or 
feelings of oneness, correlating with the emotional discharges just described.”230 
Additionally, research indicates that spiritually based meditation is much more 
effective than secular meditation at alleviating and cultivating resistance to stress, 
anxiety, and physical pain.
231
 Separating meditation, and other mystical 
experiences, techniques, and rituals from their religious origins may not be as easy 
as it seems, and may be largely counterproductive. 
 Aside from such tangible benefits, mystical experiences may have another 
kind of value. A small group of neurotheologians and anthropologists (including 
Eugene d‟Aquili) argue that mystical experiences and mythologies, regardless of 
their objective, literal truth values, can constitute important signifiers of symbolic 
value. In other words, they can be an expression of human values hardwired into 
the brain, experiential signifiers of “biogenetic”232 structure. Walter Burkert 
describes his book Creation of the Sacred as “an analysis of religious worlds in 
view of the underlying landscape”;233 such a dyadic enterprise does not only 
examine religious tradition, but also the shared human condition found in the 
biological “landscape”. Burkert‟s focus is primarily on mythology and ritual, and 
how their essential structures can be traced back to primitive behaviours. This is 
supported by d‟Aquili and Newberg‟s thesis that mystical experiences find their 
origin in manipulation of the hypothalamus, a part of the brain found in all 
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vertebrates.
234
 For example, Burkert argues that myths and rituals of sacrifice, in 
which a body part or a member of the community is forfeited or surrendered for 
the sake of the whole, resemble common evolutionary adaptations, such as lizards 
with tails that detach in the grip of a predator; “[h]ere mutilation is encoded in a 
special biological program”.235 Adaptive fact is transformed across the 
evolutionary divide into symbolic experiences and acts. Charles Laughlin and 
Johannes Loubser assert that such isomorphism is produced through 
“neurognosis”, the evolutionarily determined biogenetic structures of the brain.236 
Tying such mythological parables directly to mystical experience, Laughlin argues 
that myths finds their genesis in altered states of consciousness,
237
 and “may 
operate as innate releasing mechanisms for structures in the depths of the human 
psyche”238...“transmitting knowledge about the primal relations in the cosmos 
upon which the existence and well-being of the people depend.”239  
 Although I agree with the general idea that mythologies and mystical 
experiences contain (in certain cases
240
) symbolic knowledge, the overall tenure of 
arguments such as Laughlin‟s go too far. Mythology is not purely a result of 
mystical experience “reworked by the conscious mind”.241 Rather, mythology is 
formed by the syncretic process previously discussed: it is a combination of 
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minimally counterintuitive statements that most probably originate in dreams and 
mystical experiences, and pragmatic knowledge that persists though mechanisms 
of cultural and/or meme selection. What mystical experiences can supply are new 
ways of viewing ourselves, human life and the universe; perspectives of pragmatic 
value, some of which may be neurologically determined, but not necessarily the 
hard biogenetic truths suggested by cognitive archaeologists such as Laughlin. 
 What are these symbolic values revealed by certain mystical experiences? 
A common feature of most instances of mystical experience is an overwhelming 
perception of all objects or individuals as one. James provides an example of one 
such gestalt experience:  
I felt that I prayed as I had never prayed before, and knew now what 
prayer really is: to return from the solitude of individuation into the 
consciousness of unity with all that is, to knell down as one that 
passes away, and to rise up as one imperishable. Earth, heaven, and 
sea resounded as in one vast world-encircling harmony. It was as if 
the chorus of all the great who had ever lived were about me. I felt 
myself one of them, and it appeared as if I heard their greeting: 
“Thou too belongest to the company of those who overcome.”242 
In this example, there is a unity not only across the universe of objects, but also 
across people and consciousnesses throughout history. Mystical experiences such 
as this unveil something that we, as humans, tend to overlook: that the universe 
can be perceived and understood as an interconnected and unified whole, that time 
and space may only be constructed concepts. Human perspective and perception 
tends strongly towards splitting the totality of experience into separate fragments 
and units; and with good reason, as this process is a pragmatic aid in successfully 
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understanding and negotiating the world. However, other perspectives exist, and 
realising that our ordinary perceptions and knowledge are tethered to our niche in 
the universe and are able to be transcended, albeit on a very temporary basis, 
forms part of the human condition. This is what we could call that symbolic value 
of this type of mystical experience; it is not to say that the alternate perspective 
offered is true in an objective sense. Rather, what might be true is that different 
perspectives produce very different pictures of reality.  
 A similar kind of symbolic value is often revealed in what Stace classified 
as introvertive mystical experience, which authors such as d‟Aquili and Newberg 
describe as being perception of “absolute unitary being”. Stace takes the 
mysticism of Jan van Ruysbroeck as archetypal: 
  There follows the union without distinction. Enlightened men have 
found within themselves an essential contemplation which is above 
reason and beyond reason, and a fruitive tendency which pierces 
through every condition and all being, and in which they immerse 
themselves in a wayless abyss of fathomless beatitude...Behold this 
beatitude is so onefold and so wayless that in it every...creatureless 
distinction ceases and passes away...There all light is turned to 
darkness; there the three persons give place to the essential unity 
and abide without distinction.
243
  
This type of experience can be described as “pure consciousness”. Nothing exists 
except a sense of unity: mystic and God, subject and object are one. There is only 
consciousness. In addition to similar revelations to those regarding perspective, 
the primacy of consciousness could be the symbolic value of such an experience. 
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Consciousness and perception is all we ultimately have in our relations with the 
universe; without consciousness we are not really human. There exists a world 
“above reason and beyond reason” which perhaps we cannot understand fully 
with or without consciousness and perceptual perspectives, but possibly there is 
nothing to be understood without such necessities. Without mediation through 
some kind of consciousness, what is the universe? Can it even be said to exist?
244
  
 A third kind of symbolic value is suggested by Burkert in his discussion of 
what he labels “the shaman‟s tale”, a particular variant of mythological story that 
he surmises finds its source in primeval predator/prey narratives.
245
 This type of 
narrative follows a common pattern: an individual must leave the safety of his 
home to undertake some kind of quest (at the animal level, this entails locating 
food). However, challenges and/or dangerous enemies are encountered on the 
journey. After these tribulations, success is attained, with a moment of triumph 
followed by a desperate pursuit back to the safety of home.
246
 Shamanic and 
mystical experiences reflect this neurological imprint. For example, the 
Cashinahua of the Peruvian Amazon view their drug-induced mystical 
experiences “as the experiences of an individual‟s dream spirit; they are portents 
of things to come or reminders of the past”.247 In the mystic‟s case the quest is for 
knowledge rather than food; but spiritual nourishment is no less dangerous or 
terrifying to attain. Even prior to the correct altered state of consciousness being 
reached, “supplication, laborious service”248 or brutal asceticism may be 
necessary. Venturing away from the comfortable safety of ordinary consciousness, 
one encounters disconcerting truths, bewildering hallucinations, and the 
dissolution of the ego. It is certainly not uncommon for God to be described as 
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inducing great fear as well as love. Then once the goal is reached, pitfalls still line 
the way. As in Plato‟s cave allegory of The Republic, danger comes to those who 
claim privileged knowledge of reality. In cases such as those of Casteneda and the 
Jivaro tribe, participating in shamanic ritual opens an individual up to a world of 
dangerous magic and potential for self-harm. Burkert also notes that “a strange 
characteristic of the quest tale is the asymmetry of going and returning. The way 
back often is different from the way taken before the decisive encounter. The 
normal geometry of space seems to disintegrate.”249 In the context of mystical 
experience, this signifies the sense in which once such special knowledge is 
attained, one cannot perceive the world in the way one used to. Quest tales in 
general symbolise a pattern that repeats throughout life: the necessity of danger, 
difficulty, and of leaving one‟s comfort zone in order to grow and live a truly 
successful life. 
 This focus upon symbolic value demonstrates the potential merit of 
mystical experiences. Religious structures and beliefs have always been a 
reflection of the society they are situated within: hunter-gatherer deities are 
usually capricious controllers of animals or weather, whereas larger societies with 
complex and authoritative political structures will often worship an omnipotent 
and omniscient God, a ruler to rule all.
250
 Yet what does such an observation 
portend for today‟s society? How can secularism and the primacy of science be 
reflected in a religious system? Are reactionary fundamentalisms or fuzzy-minded 
new-age beliefs the fruits of our modern age? For all its power and innate 
presence in the human psyche, to me religion appears more and more as a 
rudderless ship, drifting in every direction. A major factor in the confusing 
multiplicity of religious forms that have arisen in the west over the past century is 
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the spreading rejection of the supernatural. Lewis-Williams observes that religion 
has always been a means of satisfying the “need to bridge, or mediate” between 
cosmological divisions, “tiers of the cosmos”.251 Traditionally, a tiered cosmos has 
been divided, basically, between the natural and the supernatural. Observable and 
hidden; clear and mysterious; man and spirit; earth and heaven; religion serves as 
an interface by which the latter is translated into the terms of the former. Through 
religion, disparate elements of the human experience are able to be interpreted in 
mutually relevant ways. 
 In today‟s society, the realm of the supernatural has shrunk to a size that 
often appears trivial. Scientific explanations, using theories of materialism and 
natural cause, can account for the existence and functions of the heavens and the 
earth, for the existence of humans and our complex thoughts, feelings, and ethical 
systems. Even the human proclivities for spirituality and religiosity do not escape 
the purview of science. Supernatural explanations are now limited to a few tiny 
spheres of the unknown: speculating that God is what existed before the big bang; 
or, in the case of d‟Aquili and Newberg, rather wishful scepticism that their fully 
scientific research on the neurological causes of mystical experience disproves the 
notion that God causes such states.
252
 As Lewis-Williams states, “scientific 
knowledge has indisputably again defeated what once was taken to be revealed 
religious knowledge”,253 and there is no reason to believe this pattern will not 
continue as it has done over the course of human civilisation.  
 Religion is not the explanatory tour de force it once was. But religion and 
science, supernatural and natural, were not always the mutually exclusive, 
opposing forces we have come to think of them as since the Enlightenment. 
                                               
251  Lewis-Williams, p. 17. 
252  See, for example: The Mystical Mind, pp. 205-211; “The neuropsychological basis of     
religions, or why God won‟t go away”, pp. 199-201. This caveat that “our research does not 
disprove theism” is found in virtually all their work. 
253  Lewis-Williams, p. 85. 
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Dennett talks of “folk religion as practical know-how”254 - religion was once a 
means of understanding and sharing pragmatic knowledge about the world. As 
was noted in my discussion of mythology, practical facts about the natural world 
and human behaviour were encoded in supernatural narratives. Thus, originally, 
there was no distinction between science and religion; they were both combined in 
human endeavours to understand the world around them. This fact is easily 
observed in the development of science during the medieval and renaissance 
periods. Scientific rationalism was utilised (Aquinas is the prime example) to 
justify belief in God. Prior to the birth of what we now call “the scientific 
method”, there was no conscious distinction between natural and supernatural, 
just between seen and unseen, and true and untrue. (As an aside, it becomes 
apparent here why attempts to classify religion as an evolutionarily adaptation 
fail; beliefs are by-products of adaptive systems, and thus beliefs in God or spirits 
are no more adaptive than beliefs in atoms or solar systems.) Today there is no 
role which the supernatural can fulfil. Materialist systems do not allow for 
supernatural intervention. This is where arguments like those of d‟Aquili and 
Newberg fall flat: how can such adherents of the scientific method allow room in 
their map of the brain for a “mystical experience” button that God presses? They 
find no evidence for such a module, and it seems bizarre that scientists would 
allow that such a closed system could be manipulated by supernatural forces. 
Realistically, the only space left for God in a modern cosmology is as creator and 
“first mover”, and nothing else. Although even this seems to be a mere extension 
of the primitive humans‟ attribution of the changing weather to the activities of 
gods given their ignorance of meteorological systems.   
 However, the human ability for religious feeling and mystical experience 
                                               
254  Dennett, Breaking the Spell, p. 156. 
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is not going anywhere. It is an undeniable part of our neurological makeup, a 
beast lying dormant in the brain of even the most militant atheist. I hold that, even 
if one recognises the irrationality and falsity of the supernatural, such emotions 
and experiences are still extremely useful. It is just a matter of interpretation and 
reaction.  
 The evidence I surveyed previously shows that religion and mystical 
experience are evolutionary by-products, results of conceptual and neurological 
modules that evolved for other reasons. However, just because something is not 
directly fitness-enhancing does not render it a worthless accident. To illustrate my 
point, I will turn to Dennett‟s discussion of byproducts and “spandrels” in 
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, his classic work on evolutionary theory. “Spandrel” has 
become a synonym for an evolutionary byproduct, and was first used in this 
context by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin. The term originates in 
architecture, denoting “the tapering triangular spaces formed by the intersection of 
two rounded arches at right angles”.255 Spandrels were utilised with artistic effect 
by the painters of cathedrals, but this does not mitigate the fact that the space is a 
necessary by-product of the “adaptations” which are the towering arches of the 
structure. Religious experience and beliefs are spandrels too; their supervenience 
upon certain modules of the brain is necessitated by the properties of those 
modules and the physical facts of how the brain operates. This fact regarding their 
reason for existence need not belittle them, for they still exist nonetheless. Dennett 
labels the spandrel as “an obligatory design opportunity”,256 and notes that the 
spandrel Gould and Lewontin focus on could be replaced by various alternatives. 
Given this, he argues, spandrels are a kind of adaptation, still a by-product and yet 
                                               
255 Stephen J. Gould and Richard C. Lewontin, “The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
paradigm: a critique of the  adaptionist programme”, Proceedings of the Royal Society. Series 
B, Biological Sciences 205:1161 (1979), pp. 581-598 (p. 581). 
256 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (New York, NY:Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 
273. 
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“designed to have the shape they have precisely in order to provide suitable 
surfaces for the display of Christian iconography.”257 Much in the same way that 
“you have to put something up there to hold up the dome – some shape or other, 
you decide which”,258 we can decide how to manage mystical experience. The 
artist decides how the spandrel will be designed; the mystic decides how her 
experience is interpreted. Much like mythologies or religious texts, mystical 
experiences are usually open to a variety of interpretations and justifications of 
use. The spandrels of a great cathedral are decorated with art rich in symbolic 
value, and the modern mystic can do very much the same with the interpretation 
of her experience. 
 Returning to my remarks about religion as an interface between 
cosmological divisions, I believe mystical experience can still be interpreted in 
such a way. However, today the division is not between the natural and the 
supernatural. The latter has been left by the wayside, but (to continue the analogy) 
it is not the only image the spandrel could convey. Mystical experience does not 
necessarily need to be a meeting of man and God. Perhaps, in the contemporary 
context, mystical experience could bridge the divide between perception and 
reality, or the subjective and objective. These could be considered the types of 
tiers extant in our modern cosmos. A cosmos split between a determinate physical 
reality and the imagination, creativity, and free will of humanity; between a grey, 
perspectiveless universe and the human qualitative understanding of it; between a 
world without meaning or innate purpose and the human conviction of the 
opposite. Perhaps even simply between the known and the unknown. To put this 
idea in a more concise (although unfortunately no less vague) way, mystical 
experience could be the ultimate statement of the human condition. Revisiting an 
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example I gave in my discussion of symbolic value, introvertive mystical 
experience could be interpreted in such a way: the ultimate expression of 
humanity is pure consciousness, as that is all we have and all we are, the world as 
we perceive it does not exist without it – in reality there are no concepts of subject 
and object, true and untrue, one and many. Everything is a lie and yet more real 
and true than could ever previously be conceived. The limited human psyche 
crosses the divide and is confronted by this limitless reality. Another relevant 
example can be found in The Teachings of Don Juan. Castaneda experiences a 
hallucinatory journey in which he flies across the landscape; when the 
hallucination passes, he finds himself some distance from where he began. 
Following the experience, he asks his mentor Don Juan if he really flew, 
physically, “as birds do”.259 Don Juan answers with a combination of scornful and 
cryptic statements: he did fly, and yet maybe his body did not. Consciousness is 
not necessarily the defined state present in ordinary perception. Perhaps the most 
revealing reply is “[t]he trouble with you is that you understand things in only one 
way.”260 Multiple and seemingly contradictory facts can be true of one state of 
affairs, as all is dependent upon perspective. In this experience, we can see a 
mediation between what Castaneda views as normal consciousness and an 
indeterminate reality that breaks from the conventions created by the former.
261
 
 An objection here could be that these interpretations fall victim to the same 
pitfalls of supernatural interpretations. Much like a theistic mystic might point to 
the moment prior to the big bang and say “that‟s where the God I saw resides!”, I 
point to the confusing world of perception and consciousness and say “that‟s 
                                               
259  Castenada, The Teachings of Don Juan, p. 128. 
260  Ibid. 
261 For an interesting philosophical discussion using Castenada‟s experience as a heuristic, and a 
demonstration of the kind of complex interpreations that can be drawn from what is one level 
just an extremely vivid drud-induced hallucination, see Laurence Foss, “Does Don Juan really 
fly?”, Philosophy of Science 40:2 (1973) pp. 298-316.  
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where the meaning of what I saw resides!” According to this accusation, I am 
simply replacing one subject area that is beset by uncertainty, yet in principle 
completely comprehensible, with another. This is a salient criticism; but I believe 
that it overlooks the fact that, historically, supernatural claims have always been 
disproved by advances in scientific knowledge. Questions regarding the 
perception/reality and subject/object distinctions, however, have always existed, 
and are arguably no closer to being solved than when they were debated in 
antiquity. These are true philosophical puzzles, problems of the human condition. 
To my mind, seeking an understanding of these problems, and not whether a more 
powerful being controls us, might be the true calling of humanity. 
 Another issue is how such interpretations could be pragmatically useful. 
There is no singular answer to this; valuable action can take all forms, and often it 
might be partly determined by the goals for flourishing already present in a 
person‟s mind. The use is dependent upon individual reaction. Possessing greater 
personal understanding could be action-enhancing. One could merely be inspired 
by the rich multiplicity and beauty of consciousness or reality. A demonstration of 
the power inherent in consciousness could motivate an individual that anything is 
possible if its power is harnessed. The gift of lateral thinking is another possibility. 
Above all, what I am arguing is that interpretation is the key. Any experience, 
great or small, can be a source for great deeds if the right interpretation is applied.    
 Note that I am not claiming that this is exactly how mystical experiences 
should be interpreted, or that there is any correct or definitive interpretation of any 
particular experience. Understanding these experiences in supernatural or theistic 
terms is unavoidable in certain cases or for certain individuals; the neurologically 
determined hyperactive agent detection device ensures that if nothing else. The 
argument above is more about demonstrating how mystical experiences can retain 
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powerful relevance in a secular, material world. The ultimate value of these 
experiences lies in the meaning and use the individual takes from them. To borrow 
John Dewey‟s words, all I wish to see is mystical and religious experiences 
introducing “genuine perspective”262 into peoples‟ lives, perspective that 
facilitates practical understanding of and engagement with the world. After all, 
this is the gift that all experience provides. Experience is the fountain of 
knowledge, and knowledge gives the gift of action.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
262  Dewey, p. 24. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
I have demonstrated how mystical experience can be understood, not necessarily 
as an individual‟s relationship with God or the supernatural, but as a source of 
human value. In fact, I have demonstrated that such human value is the only real 
means we have of understanding mystical experience. For some, the attribution of 
value to certain experiences will act as an aid in the confirmation of them as true, 
objective perceptions of God or whatever the purported object might be. Others, 
such as myself, will be eager to leave such approximations by the wayside, and 
focus solely on the extraordinary, overwhelming power wielded by mysticism in 
purely human terms. 
 This often incredible value derived from mystical experience is all we 
have in terms of apprehending it. In this context, where traditional epistemologies 
provide few (or perhaps too many) answers in the face of mysterious perceptions, 
the strength of pragmatism as an epistemology becomes readily apparent. With its 
focus upon effect and its meaning for the individual, abstract conceptualisations of 
reality are thrust aside in favour of the implications of perception for action. 
 Utilising my pragmatic definition of mystical experience, it can cease to be 
necessarily viewed as a window to the supernatural and instead as a tool. Mystical 
experience can become an interpretive device, revealing the multifarious structure 
of perceptual possibility and perhaps even reality, allowing insights into the 
deepest underlying elements of consciousness and the mind, and exploring what is 
to be human or even what it is to be a conscious being. These experiences can take 
on any kind of symbolism, and more than ever it is within our grasp to understand 
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it. Mystical experience should no longer be considered a one-way street down 
which the supernatural delivers images, icons and messages; instead a 
fundamental part of its character lies in the interpretive act. As with anything else 
presented to our consciousness, it is we who give it meaning.   
 The power of the mystical consciousness supersedes anything else ever 
conceived of by the human mind. No matter what our ontology, no matter what 
our theory of religion, it will not disappear so long as we have our humanity. It is 
our duty as members of modern civilisation to harness its power for tangible 
benefit and to maximise its utility in worldly ways. Although we cannot escape it, 
ultimately we are the masters of hallucination. 
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